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INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. 
(New York based 
interstate polluter) 
Cert to CA~auf~ Pratt, 
Miner) r-(per curiam) ~------/ 
v. ~L 
OUELLETTE et al. 
(Vermont property 
owners) 
Federal/C iv i 1 Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that t:1e Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act, 33 U.S .C. §1253 et seq. (FWPCA) ~~g a 
state common law nuisance action against an alleged polluter of 
~ 
an interstate body of water in the courts and under the law of a 
state other than that in which the discharge occurs. 
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2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Resps 
Vermont who own property on the shores of 
are: ::~) 
Lake Champlain, 
aninterstate body of water. In 1978, resps filed suit in a Ver-
mont court against petr, a New York Corporation that operates a 
paper mill on th ?:--s~ re roughly opposite resps' property. Claim-
-~.,,~ I\ 
ing that the discharges from the mill had fouled their proper-
ties, resps sought nearly $120 million in damages and various 
---, 
forms of injunctive relief. According to petr, the relief sought 
would "require it to completely restructure its water treatme nt 
system." Petn at 2. Although the complaint advanced a variety of 
legal theories, the only one still at issue is the claim that l ~ 
petr 's conduct constituted a "~ tinuin~~is~~c " under the com-
mon law of Vermont. ---------------~ Petr successfully sought removal to Federal District Court. f)c 
(D.Vt. Coffrin, CJ). After a protracted battle over class certi-
fication, petr moved for dismissal pursuant to FRCP 12 (c) and 
56 ( b) • Upon the suggestion of the court, the parties agreed to --postpone argument on the motion until after t h e CA? rendered its 
decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (1984),1~ 
cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. City of Hammond, 105 S .Ct. 979 j ~ 
(1985). 
a. The Milwaukee Litigation. Th ~ 's decision in Milwaukee 
was the final chapter in a protracted suit concerning pollution 
of Lake Michigan. Initially, Illinois had sought to invoke this 
Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a complaint that Milwau-
kee had discharged inadequately treated sewage into the lake. In 
the course of declining to exercise original jurisdiction, the 
• 
• 
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Court held that a federal common law of nuisance 
suit. 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972). I l linois promptly brought suit in 
ND Ill, and the DC granted the relief sought. Shortly thereafter, 
Cong~ ss amended the FWPCA to establish a new s y s~em of federal ~ ~ ------------------·---------------------regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to discharge pol- L 
~ ------------------------------~---------....__-.......___..._,,. M-V 
lutants into the nation's waters except pursuant to a permit. _______ __,,~.---~ 
The CA7 affirmed the DC, holding that "it is federal common law 
and not state statutory law that controls this case" and reject-
'---
ing the claim that the FWPCA had preempted federal common law. /l;~ 
599 F.2d,- at 177 n.53. ~ Cour~~acated ~ r : -~~nded, holdinjJ( 
that federal common law had been ~/t'eN the FWPCA' s compre- ~ 
hensive regulatory scheme. 451 U.S. 304 (1981) . 
On remand, Illinois argued that even though federal common 
----~ 
law was now clearly preempted, it could still sue under state 
statutory and common law unless the FWPCA manifested a clear in-- ·---------------------------------------
tent to preempt such law. Relying on various "savings provi-
'--- - - --- ----------
sions" in the federal act, Illinois asserted that such an intent 
was clearly lacking. Illinois placed pa rt icular reliance on 
§1365 (e), which provides that "nothing in this section shall re-
strict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have 
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any efflu-
ent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." The CA7 
rejected theJ * gument. It concluded that §1365 (e) merely pre--~ served the right to bring suit against a discharger in the courts Uf7 
~ 
of the state from which the discharge came and under the laws o:J ~ 
- I"). But the Court found it "implausible that ~ 
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(State II) or its citizens to seek enforcement of limitation on 
discharges in State I by applying the statutes or common law of 
State II." 731 F.2d, at 414. Any contrary conclusion, the court 
observed, would violate the value of federal uniformity embodied 
in the FWPCA. 
Illinois petitioned for cert, and the Court CVSGed. The ~ 
argued that the CA7's analysis was entirely correct and urged the 
Court to deny cert. The SG observed that the Court's decisions -in the area "left no doubt that the . law of one state could not be 
relied upon to abate a discharge in another state ." Br. of SG in 
84-21 at 7. (He did note that the suit no longer contained a live 
claim for damages, and declined to address any questions of the 
permissible reach of state law in such a case: id., at 12 n.10.) 
The SG also agreed with the CA7's suggestion "that 
on the law of the state of oischarge would not be preempted." 
Id., at 13. The Court denied cert, Justices White and Blackmun 
-- ---~ _____--c...-- ~ -------------------dissenting without opinion. (.Justice Powell did not participat-:--
b. The OC Opinion. Having awaited the CA7's opinion, the 
DC expressly declined to follow its reasoning or analysis. 
c rue ia l quest ion was not whether the FWPCA preemp tea state 
For, there was no question that federal law governed intersta 
pollution disputes. The question instead was whether federal law 
authorized, either expressly or implicitly, resort to state com-
mon law in the circumstances of the case. Disagreeing with the 
CA7, the oc concluded that it aia. In addition to §1365(e), 
quoted above, the DC relied on §1370, which provides that "noth-
ing in this chapter shall ... be construed as impairing or in any 
a 
- -- 5 - Jj G ~ ~ 
C,..~ 
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the State s with 
respect to the waters . . . of such States. " The CA 7 had construed 
these provisions to "preserve a state's nuisance law only as it 
applies to discharges emanating from within that state." Petn A-
""'-'~~ 
13. The better view, the ~ de ':.,<_ was that "the Act author-
izes actions to redress injury caused by water pollution of in-
terstate waters through the laws of the state in which the injury 
occurred,." Id. After examining the course of the FWCPA's legis-
~ 
lative h istory in conjunction with the timing of this Court's 
pronouncement in Milwaukee I, the OC observed: "Given the law 
during the time of the FWPCA's framing, it is completely reason-
able to assume that Congress believed that a plaintiff suffering 
in State A might sue under the laws of State A to recover for 
injuries sustained as the result of pollution emanating from 
State B. It thus seems inescapable that Congress, by passage of 
[§1370 and §1365(e)] intended to preserve such an action." A-15. 
Moreover, the OC observed, the CA7's holding was incongrous. Ac-
cording to the CA7, these "savings provisions" could not have 
"saved" Illinois's "right" to bring an action under Illinois law 
because, at the time of enactment, there was no such right to 
"save." This was so, the CA7 believed, because, under Milwaukee 
I, federal common law had already occupied the field by the time 
of the FWPCA' s enactment. If that were truly the case, the DC 
noted, there could be no possible authority for suit in Wisconsin 
Court under Wisconsin law. 
such a suit permissible. 
Yet the CA7 would apparently find 
• 
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The DC also observed that the CA7's opinion created a bi-
zarre choice of law rule under which a state mu s t apply the law 
of the state from which the pollution emanates regardless of the 
forum's choice of law rules. Finally, the DC no tea that the 
CA7's concern about "chaotic confrontations between sovereign 
states" was inapt given that the present suit involved private 
parties. While an injunction to abate the nuisance would, to 
some degree, have an effect on the regulatory framework of the 
state in which the polluter was located, such e·ffect would be 
purely "inc iden ta 1." 
The DC certified its rulingy r interlocutory appeal pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The CA2 affirmed in a two paragraph 
PC, which adopted the reasoning of the DC in all respects materi-
al to th is pe tn. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the decision below 
has genera tea a circuit split on an issue of profound national 
importance: whether the FWPCA authorizes a state law nuisance 
action against an alleged polluter other than in the courts and 
under the law of the state in which the a i scha rge occurs. The 
decision below exposes industries that discharge effluents into 
interstate waters to the varying statutory and common laws of all 
the states whose boundaries touch on those waters. Accordingly, 
the decision gives rise to the possibility of irreconciliable 
conflicts in the legal obligations to which they will be subject. 
Given that the 48 contiguous states have borders contiguous with 
bodies of interstate water, the issue presented is sure to be a 
recurring one. 
• 
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On the merits, petr adopts the reasoning of the CA7 in Mil-
waukee. The CA2 was simply wrong in suggesting that, at the time 
of the FWPCA's enactment, Congress believed that there was any 
state law cause of action for interstate pollution. Thus, there 
is no basis for the 1inch pin of the CA2's analysis--that the 
savings provisions were enacted at a time when Congress assumed 
that state law could apply to interstate water disputes. 
The CA2's suggestion that a contrary holding would be at 
odds with conventional choice of law principles misses the point 
entirely. As the SG pointed out in · his amicus brief in Milwau-
kee, there is no question that federal law governs in this con-
text. If that law requires application of the law of the state 
of the discharger rather than resort to the forum's choice of law 
principles, there is no inconsistency with the principle of Klax-
on v. Ste n to r , 3 13 U . S . 4 8 7 ( 1 9 41 ) ( re q u i r in g a fed e r a 1 c ou rt 
sitting in diversity to apply choice of law principles of forum 
state) • 
Final l y, the fact that the case involves only private par-
ties is irrelevant. The impact of the decision below on New 
York is more than II inc iden ta 1. 11 More importantly, the federal 
interests in uniformity and predictability simply do not turn on 
the nature of the parties. None of the decisions of this Court 
in this area even hint at such a distinction. 
Resp, adopting the reasoning below, maintains that permit-
ting t h e suit to proceed in a Vermont Court under Vermont common 
law is fully consistent with the letter and history of the stat-
ute as well as with this Court's pronouncements in the area. The 
II 
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contention that the suit can only proceed in a New York Court has 
no logical basis other than an "insulting" fear that the OCVt 
will yield to local bias. The contention that New York rather 
than Vt. law should apply is a red herring since there is no evi-
dence at all that there is any difference between the common law 
of nuisance in these states. 
Nor, resp contends, is the alleged circuit split a basis for 
granting cert as the CA7's decision is distinguishable in several 
important respects: 1) This is a suit between private parties; 2) 
this is a suit for damages and abatement rather than for direct 
regulation of the effluent levels discharged by a polluter in a 
sister state; and 3) federalism concerns are significantly dimin-
ished in the context of what boils down to an ordinary tort suit. 
4. DISCUSSION: This looks like a grant to me. The 
case presents a clean circuit split on an issue of obvious na-
tional importance. While it is true that in some respects the 
CA7's decision in Milwaukee is distinguishable, it is far from 
evident how the distinctions relied on by resp are of any signif-
icance. Resp is wrong in suggesting that either the reasoning or 
the language of Milwaukee is limited to circumstances in which a 
state is suing a state. Indeed, in one of the consolidated cases 
before the CA7, the plaintiff was a private party. Moreover, 
although the opinion hedg ea a bit, the CA 7 sta tea: "It is clear 
that the federal nature of the problem, and the basic interests 
of federalism do not depend on the case being a state versus a 
state case." 731 F.2d, at 407. Nor does the fact that resps are 





t'.;5'ugh the parties b efore it were not seeking money damages, the 
~ 7 strongly suggested that ordinary tort principles should never 
I 
apply in interstate pollution suits.~, at 411 n.3. In any 
event, resps here are seeking injunctive relief in add it ion to 
----- - ~ damages . 
Somewhat troubling is the contention that none of this makes 
any difference since New York and Vermont have the same common 
law of nuisance. Even if that were the case, which is far from 
clear, the fact remains that the CA7 and CA2 have reache::l pre-- ._,, ~ 
cisely the opposite conclusion on whether the law of the state of 
·------·---~ 
injury can ever apply in a suit against an out-of-state polluter 
-----------------0 f interstate waters. Regardless of whether New York and Vt. law 
~
are in fact in conformity, this issue seems certworthy. 
Another CVSG is certainly an option here. But, unless the 
SG's position has changed in the last 14 months, that course is 
not likely to be especially fruitful. As noted, the SG 's last 
submission did expressly d 'ecline to address the applicability of 
the FWPCA to a pure damages action. Because, however, resps are 
al so seeking injunctive relief, I doubt the government 's 
postition would be any different in the circumstances of this 
case. Even if it were, it seems to me that its postition would 
only bear on the merits and not on whether the case was 
certworthy. 
Although a CVSG certainly couldn't hurt, I recommend a 
GRANT. 
There is a response. 
- -- 10 -
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September 23, 1986 
INTERNA GINA-POW 
85-1233 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette (CA2) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
The actors in this drama are the plaintiffs below 
(respondents here), Vermont residents who own property in 
Vermont on Lake Champlain. Defendant below, petitioner 
here, is the International Paper Co., the largest in the 
United States, that operates a paper mill across the Lake 
near the famous French and Indian War site of Ticonderoga. 
I inject here that Lake Champlain is one of the most 
beautiful and historic of our eastern lakes. 
Respondents brought t h is suit for damages and an 
injunction in which it was alleged that pollution of the 







constituted a "continuing 
brought originally in state 
court, and was removed to the DC of Vermont (Chief Judge 
Coffrin, presiding). Petitioner moved to dismiss the 
complaint pursuant to Rules 12(c) [Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings], and Rule 56 (c) [Summary Judgment]. 
Petitioner contended (i) that its paper mill was operating 
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Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) that permitted 
discharges of specified amounts; and (ii) that federal 
rather than state law applies to interstate water 
pollution; and (iii) that the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA) , preempted the field of water 
pollution abatement, thus barring any claim brought under 
federal law or state common law for interstate water 
pollution. 
The DC, in a full opinion, concluded that the FWPCA 
authorizes actions to redress injury caused by water 
pollution of interstate waters under the common law of the 
state in which the injury occurred; and that the 
respondent's complaint stated a cause of action for common 
law nuisance. In reaching this conclusion, the DC 
recognized that it created a conflict - at least in part -
with CA7's decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 
F. 2d 403 ( 1984) , cert. denied by this Court. In that 
case, CA7 concluded that §1365(e) of the FWPCA merely 
preserved the right to bring suit against a water polluter 
in the courts of the state from which the discharge of the 
pollution occurred, and also pursuant to the laws of that 
state (sometime referred to as "state I"). The DC in this 
case rejected the reasoning of CA7, although it did note 
I 
- - 3. 
that here only private parties are involved whereas in 
Milwaukee the states of Wisconsin and Illinois also were 
involved. Nevertheless, the rationale of CA7 with respect 
to which law controls conflicts with the conclusion 
reached in the present case that the law of Vermont (State 
II) controls. 
Petitioner's brief, prepared by one of New York's 
better law firms (Simpson, Thatcher and Bartlett), relies 
of course - on the Milwaukee case. Petitioner 
emphasizes policy goals. 
that the DC and CA2 
construct ion of FWPCA, 
It points out, with a reason, 
in this case have "adopted a 
and of th is Court's precedents, 
that would produce a parochial patchwork of conflicting 
multistate regulation of interstate waters, and of 'point 
sources' that discharge into such waters." It was noted 
that such a reading of the federal statute would defeat 
the purpose of a comprehensive system of federal and 
source state regulation of the discharge of pollutants 
into interstate waters. Emphasis also is placed on the 
practical problems that the decisions below would cause. 
A company like petitioner may discharge a fluid into the 
waters of an interstate lake that has boundaries on 
several states. If, as would be entirely possible if not 
• 
• 
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likely, the common and statutory laws of these states may 
vary so that such a company - even though its discharge 
was legal under federal standards - nevertheless could 
face damage suits based on the differing laws of several 
states. This argument has substantial appeal. 
Nevertheless, and I must say to my surprise, the SG 
has filed an amicus brief strongly supporting affirmance -------------- ----
of the basic holding of the courts below. I should have 
said above that CA2, in a brief PC, affirmed the Vermont 
DC except in respects not presently relevant. The SG 
first notes that respondent's complaint did not contend 
that only the nuisance law of Vermont must be applied. 
Rather, apparently the complaint can be read as relying on 
whichever state nuisance law may apply under federal 
preemption principles and state choice of law rules. The 
SG then notes that the Clean Water Act expressly preserves 
New York common law in a case such as this, and that 
therefore a Vermont federal court sitting in Vermont had 
jurisdiction to apply New York law. On this basis alone, 
the SG concludes that the DC correctly denied petitioner's 
motion to dismiss. 
As the courts below did not confine their rejection 
of petition er' s mot ion to this basis, the case presents 
• 
• 
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the more difficult question whether federal law has 
preempted the availability in this action of Vermont's 
nuisance law. The SG concludes, for reasons not entirely 
clear to me at this time, that the decision below could be 
read as holding that "either New York or Vermont law could 
govern all aspects of this case, depending solely on 
Vermont's choice of law principles", citing Klaxon Coe v. 
Stentor Electric Co., 313 U.S. 487. The SG states that 
this view - while unnecessary to the result in this case -
is "erroneous in its broad and unlimited scope". The SG 
then makes this distinction: 
"Respondents may not rely on Vermont 
nuisance law to support either an abatement 
remedy or a punitive damages award, unless New 
York law would itself call for application of 
Vermont law. In the Clean Water Act Congress 
deliberately assigned the federal government and 
the source state (New York) the preeminent roles 
in fashioning effluent limitations and standards 
applicable to source of interstate 
pollution." (Br. 6). 
But a claim for compensatory relief based on Vermont 
nuisance law is not subject to the "same federal 
preemption limitations. The Federal Clean Water Act and 
its legislative history explicitly preserve any otherwise 
applicable state common law damage remedies, even when a 
discharger of a pollutant is in compliance with federal 
• 
• 
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regulations." The SG was not "unaware of the problems 
presented to an interstate discharger" created by this 
view that permits the application of varying state laws to 
the same pollution. But this is a "policy choice" that 
should be left for Congress. 
* * * 
This case is a difficult one for me. I would l i ke a 
memorandum with my clerks recommendations. I have not 











principles - is reasonable. I agree that the views of the 
courts below, now adopted in major part by the SG, places 
like International Paper into difficult companies 
positions. We have a number of large lakes in this 
country on which several states have borders, and I 
suppose it is quite possible that the nuisance laws of 
these states - both common and statutory - vary widely. I 
am interested in the distinction the SG draws between 
compensatory and punitive damager.- If his view of the 
Clean Water Act in this respect is correct, the case will 
be a great deal easier for me. 
~ 
It wa:dd make sense for 
X-- ~ ~~ ~~ 9 ~ &f ~l--
--1-u a.~ ~ ~ S" G-".r' ~ ~c::: ~ 
• 
• 
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parties like respondents to recover compensatory damages, 
but there are strong reasons of fairness against 
permitting punitive damages. In this case, for example, 
it appears that petitioner is in full compliance with the 
Clean Water Act and could have had no clear idea whether 
additional steps must be taken to prevent being held 
liable under the common law or statutory law of adjoining 
states. Thus, there hardly could have been any 
"malicious" or grossly negligent conduct by petitioner. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell October 2, 1986 
From: Andy 
Re: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233 
Argument: , 1986 
Cert to the CA2 (Kaufman, Pratt, Miner} 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
The question presented is whether the Federal Water 
I l __.\-
Pollution Control Act authorizes a common law suit brought in -----------Vermont court under Vermont law, where the source of the alleged 
injury is located in New York. 
• 
• 
e - 2. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Lake Champlain forms part of the boundary between New York 
and Vermont. International Paper Co. ("IPC") is a corporation 
located on the NY side of the lake, resps are property owners on 
the Vt shore. Resps filed a class action suit against petr in 
1978, alleging that IPC was creating a "continuous nuisance" by 
discharging pollution-causing effluents into the lake. Resps 
asked for $20 million in compensatory damages, $100 million in 
punitive damages, plus injunctive relief which would require petr 
to restructure its water treatment system. 
A word about the statutory background is necessary to set ----
the stage for this dispute. The discharge of effluents into 
interstate waters is regulated by the Federal Water Pollution 
------., 
Control Act, 33 u.s.c. §1251, et. seq. {1982~ Under EP,4-
the Act, the Environmental Protection Agency establishes minimum /U.-f:5 
di ~ ds which a corporation (the "source") i~~~ 
required to meet to obtain a federal operating permit. The state 
in which the source is located (the •~~ ..»-r ce :::?!;ate") then has the 
option to set more stringent discharge standards, in which case 






purposes of this case we may assume tha.t-- IPC- me t---. the ~~ 
federal and NY permit requirements. 
----?...IL~ l"'WlLl-.a..LL 
4- 'k-'1 4---/-~~ 
/2--~ 
The ~ A contemplates a ~ oi~ E:J which _§.! e 
the waterway with the source, these states may be 
harmed by the pollution (the "affected states"). Before the 
federal permit is issued, the affected states may lodge a protest 
to the proposed standards with the EPA. A state may not, 
• 
• 
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however, block the 
system of its own. 
issuance of a permit or establish a permit 
In response to the class action complaint, petr moved for 
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, claiming that 
common law suits are preempted by the FWPCA. !PC's argument was 
based on a trio of 
City of Milwaukee. 
common law remedy for 
involving Illinois and the 
his Court created a federal 
caused by interstate water 
pollution. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Although 
the issue was not presented directly, it was clear from the 
decision that this federal remedy preempted all state common law 
actions. Congress noted, however, that future legislation could 
abbrogate the need for federal common law. Id., at 107 • 
Congress then passed detailed amendments to the FWPCA in ----
19 72. Consequently, the Court in M:flwaukee II _,,A" uled that the ) 
federal government now had "occupie~ ield" of pollution 
regulation, and that therefore ~ common law was preempted. 
451 U.S. 304 (1982). The Court specifically declined to rule 
whether state action r ernai:neq_y iable in light of the amendments. 









J~ the two Supreme '1:-4.-~ cisions was to preempt state common law ~ 
731 F.1d 403 (CA7 1984), cert. denied sub nom, actions as well. 
Scott v. City of Hammond, 105 S. Ct. 979 (1985). The CA7 
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to allow each 
state along an interstate waterway to impose its own law on the 
source, thereby establishing a liability standards beyond what 
was required by the permit. The only exception, said the CA7, 
- - 4. 
was that common law actions could be maintained in the source 
state using source ,...,.______ its motions that 
under the decision and reasoning in Milwaukee III, resps were 
barred from filing suit in any state except NY. 
The Vt district court rejected 
denied the motions. The de began 
the CA7 's conclusions 
by acknowledging that 
and 
the 
regulation of interstate water pollution normally is a matter of 
federal law. The question, said the court, was whether the FWPCA 
preserved state common law rights. The de looked to 2 sections 
of the 1972 FWPCA amendments for its answer: §1370 states that 
nothing in this 
impairing or in 
jurisdiction of 
[boundary waters] 
chapter shall ••. be construed as 
any manner affecting any right or 
the States with respect to the 
of such States. 
• In addition, §1365(e) provides that 
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which 
any person (or class of persons) may have under any 
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other 
relief .... (emphasis added) . 
. vf-Srs 
The dcA held that these two provisions (collectively, the 
"savings clause") made it clear that Congress did not preempt the 
field entirely. ,..______,, 
----- -









clause became part of the FWPCA, interstate water disputes still ~-
were governed by state law. The de thus found it "completely 
reasonable" to assume that Congress intended to preserve all 
~
common law actions, even those filed in the affected states. The 
~
court rejected the CA7's conclusion that the savings clause 
merely preserved the right to sue in the source state under 
,. -
- - s. 
source state law. The de found no support for this distinction 
in either the statute or the Milwaukee opinions. 
The de hypothesized that the CA7 's exception for source-
state claims was an attempt to reconcile the plain language of 
the savings clause with the perceived problems of allowing the 
law of several states to regulate the actions of a single source. 
The de concluded that these concerns were exaggerated, finding 
that state common law actions would have only an "incidental" 
effect on pollution regulation. The court also distinguished 
this case from the Milwaukee decisions, noting that here the 
-----
dispute involved private parties, hereby removing any danger - - ·-- ~ . -·· . -------------
of one state interferin g with another's sovereign interests. 
ThEY7cA2 affirmed the de holding and reasoning in a short, 
• unpublished opinion. 
II. DISCUSS ION 
The parties agree that interstate water pollution is 
primarily a matter of federal law. There also is no disagreement 
that the FWPCA permits some type of state common law action to 
supplement federal remedies. The nly issu is whether and when _____ _______, 
an action may be brought under the law of an affected state. 
















the degree to which the FWPCA allows common law suits. 
respective positions are outlined below; unfortunately, 
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• A. 
)I I\. / ";) / ) 
Only in the Source State l ~ &i }'.-Ltv, 
IPC adopts the reasoning of the CA? in Milwaukee III. Petr 
argues that the FWPCA precludes all common law suits except those 
filed in the source state under source-state law. IPC says its 
position is supported by precedent, legislative history, and 
sound public policy. 
The first prong of petr's argument is that the savings 
clause should be interpreted narrowly. IPC claims that the 
clause did not "save" any right to file suit in an affected 
state, because by the time 1972 amendments were passed, state 
common law had been preempted completely by federal common law. 
See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S., at 107 & n. 9. Petr concedes that 
prior to Milwaukee I, state law arguably controlled interstate 
I water pollution disputes. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Co., 
4 O 1 u . S . 4 9 3 , 4 9 8 n . 3 . (19 7 1) ( s i mi 1 a r po 11 u t ion d i s put e in 
federal court "would have to be adjudicated under state law." 
[citing Erie]). But Milwaukee I was decided 6 months before 
final passage of the amendments; Congress thus must have been 
aware that at the time the savings clause became law, there was 
no reserved state right of action. 
IPC next asserts that if the savings clause did not preserve 
state suits, the authority to do so must be implied from the 
FWPCA. Petr claims / however, that it is inconsistent with the 
statutory scheme to find such a right. Congress clearly intended 
to give primary responsibility for setting pollution standards to 
the EPA and the source state. If each affected state were 
allowed to impose its own laws on the source, this intent is 
- - 7. 
• frustrated because sources will be forced to adjust their 
discharge levels to comply with the most stringent liability 
standard imposed by state common law. The permits cease to 
establish the permissible level of discharge, and thus become 
superfluous. Surely Congress did not intend to establish an 
elaborate permit system to regulate pollution, while at the same 
time leaving open the possibility that a single source may be 
regulated by each state along the waterway. 
Finally, a contrary rule would subject the source to a 
variety of amorphous and possibly inconsistent common law 
---------- - - -standards from the affected states. See Milwaukee III, 713 F.2d 
at 414 (allowing common law suits would make it "virtually 
impossible" to predict standards for liability). It is 
I unreasonable to expect a source to monitor all the common law 
developments in each affected state, and to constantly adjust its 
discharge level accordingly. 
Because of these concerns, says IPC, the most logical 
reading of the savings clause is that Congress only intended to 
preserve the right to bring common law suits under source state 
law. This reading preserves the EPA/source-state partnership, 
and is consistent with the statutory scheme of allowing source 
states to impose more stringent controls on pollution. It also 
subjects the source to only one body of common law, avoiding the 
confusion and possibly inconsistent results that would come from 
a series of decisions from the various states. 
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• 
to assert that Congress meant to "save" the decision in Milwaukee 
.J in the 1972 amendment. The savings clause was drafted and 
debated in both Houses of Congress ~ e Milwaukee I was 
---, 
• 
decided, and petr does not cite any legislative history to show 
that Congress noted or discussed the change in the law before the 
amendments were passed. As the Court recognized in Milwaukee II: 
It is difficult to argue that particular provisions [in 
the amendment] were designed to preserve a federal 
common law remedy not yet recognized by this Court [in 
Milwaukee I] • 
. . . 
During the legislative activity resulting in the 1972 
Amendments ..• this Court's decision in Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chemical Corp .••• indicated that state 
common law would control a claim such as [the one in 
the present case]. 451 U.S., at 327 n. 19. (emphasis 
in original). 
!PC's better argument is 
affected states to override 
that the decision below allows 
l, I -· the statutory permit syste~ by 
requiring the source to serve several masters. Congress wanted 
the source states to control its own pollution standards, but the 
Vt de decision allows other states to frustrate that goal. New 
York, for example, may have made a rea~oned @ decision to allow 
"X" amount of effluent discharge. This level may be the same as 
the federal standard or it may be higher; regardless, it 
represents NY's judgment of how to balance the competing 
interests of clean water, costs to industry, competing uses of 
the water, etc. A Vermont nuisance suit, however, trumps the NY 
decision. A company such as IPC will now have to set its 
discharge level to satisfy Vt's calculation of what level of 
pollution is "correct" (i.e., what level will avoid liability). 
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This is a compelling argument, perhaps even a decisive one; s /.j_.t 
nevertheless, there are flaws in petr's reasoning. ~ 
LAA.. 
nothing in the language of the savings clause or the legislative f-,Lf-v'5 
history indicates that suits from citizens of affected states are ~ 
barred. More specifically, there is no support for petr's 
proposed distinction between source-state and affected-state 
claims. All indications are to the contrary; as one Senate 
Report stated, the savings clau s e: 
---------would specifically preserve E..!lY_ other rights or 
remedies under E..!2Y_ other law. Thus, if · damages could 
be shown, other · reme'dies would remain available. 
Compliance -with requ-irements under this Act would not 
be a defense t _Q_ a common· law action for pollution 
damages. s. Rep No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess 81 
(1971) (emphasis added}. 
@ IPC overplays its hand in arguing that the decision 
of the Vt. de will render the federal permit system superfluous. 
I agree that common law suits have the potential to override the 
standards set in the permits, but this is equally true whether 
the common law suit is filed in the affected state or in the 
source state. A NY judicial decision has the same potential to 
frustrate the decision made by the EPA and the NY legislature as 
does a Vt judgment. (In other words if the EPA sets the 
discharge level at "X", and NY sets the level at "X-1", the NY 
courts still may find common law liability unless the discharge 
is "X-2" or lower.} The interference with the permit system 
occurs when ~ state common law suits are allowed, not simply 
those filed in affected states. Petr does not explain why Vt 
suits will interfere with the permit scheme, but why the NY suits 
will not. 
• 
- - 10. ?~ 
Finally, it is hard to see why we should be concerned that ~~ 
IPC may be subjected to varying laws from affected states. Other ~ . r 
types of industry routinely are required to comply with disparate ~k,Uf 
state laws when they engage in interstate commerce. Car 
manufacturers, for example, must meet higher emission standards 
in California than in Nevada. There is no reason to think that 




i adapt to different laws which regulate a single type of conduct 





than any other type of business. So while the pol icy concerns 
about subjecting IPC to inconsistent Vt law are legitimate, they 
should not be the exclusive consideration when determining the 
scope of the savings clause. 
I B. All State Actions Authorized 
Resps takes the most expansive view of the savings clause. 
- - -~ 
They maintain that as long as jurisdiction otherwise is proper, 
any common law suit may be brought in any affected state under 
that state's law. This position is appealing in some respects, 
but does not answer the concerns raised by petr. 
To a large extent resps' arguments are the obverse of the 
IPC claims discussed above. Resps start with the premise that 
this type of dispute would have been g9verned by state law before 
the 1972 amendments, and that consequently the savings clause 
preserves the action now. A diversity tort suit normally is 
governed by the law of the state in which the injury occurs, 
Young v. Mancusi, 289 U.S. 253, 258-59 (1933), raising a 
presumption in this case that Vt is a proper forum. Resps argue 
• 
- - 11. 
that the only way for IPC to overcome this presumption is to 
prove that the FWPCA explicitly preempts a common law remedy. 
This Court has found federal preemption in two types of ~ 
. ~~ 
situations relevant to this case.(Firs t,) preemption is presumed 
when the "scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
'left no room' for supplementary state regulation." Hillsborough 
County, Fla., v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 105 S. Ct. 2371, 
2375 (1985). Seco state law is nullified to the extent it 
"actually conflicts'..- with the federal statute.l Ibid. 
Resps persuasively argue that the FWPCA is not so 
comprehensive that Vt law is preempted. Both the savings clause 
and the provision allowing source states to impose higher permit 
I~ 
• standards prove that Congress "left some room" for supplemental 
state regulation. It is not enough for IPC to show that sound 
policy considerations lead to an inference of preemption; 
Congress must have made a relatively clear statement that federal 
law provides the exclusive remedy. Id., at 2377. Resps argue 
that here there was no such statement, and that therefore Vt 
retains its traditional power to protect its environment and the 
health of its citizens. 
1 The Court also has found preemption when "the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be 
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject." 105 S. Ct. at 2375 (citation omitted). The 
parties do not argue this point separately, and so neither 
do I. It strikes me that this standard is covered fully 
by examining whether the federal statute is so 
comprehensive that there is no room for state regulation, 
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It seems, however, that a Vt nuisance suit against a New 
Yor L source .Jioes co~ with the the FWPCA. As mentioned, the 
only role contemplated for affected states is that they may 
comment and object to the proposed permit levels set by the EPA 
or the source state. If Vt citizens may bring a nuisance suit, 
however, they obtain a more powerful voice in setting pollution 
-----------c 
levels than the FWPCA provides. Resps thus will be able to 
direct the behavior of polluting companies indirectly through 
lawsuits, when they could not do so directly under the Act. 
More importantly, certain common law remedies could 
eviscerate the FWPCA permit system. Resps in this case are 
asking for injunctive relief; i r' successful, they could force IPC 
either to restructure its discharge system or to shut down. IPC 
must account for this possibility when making its business 
decisions, despite its compliance with federal and NY permit 
requirements. Even if injunctions were not allowed, a $100 
million judgment against IPC surely would cause the company to 
change its behavior to reduce the discharge, thus forcing the 
desired abatement. 
The ~ is that by reading the savings clause as 
narrowly as petr suggests, out-of-state citizens have no rights, 
which is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. If 
the statute is read broadly, however, affected-state citizens may 
circumvent the statutory scheme, which is contrary to the obvious 
VI- -
~t-





Congressional intent. Consequently, the SG offers a third S 6- · g 
a ~ ve, one ,:hat makes its __::,_wn __yolicy judgment about the ~ --proper level -vi...a 
- - 13 • 
• c. Allowing Compensatory Damages Only 
The SG agrees that Vt. citizens should be permitted to bring 
suits against NY polluters, even under Vt. law. Because of the 
concerns outlined above, however, the SG would place an important I S~g 
qualification on this right. - ~ If an action is for compensatory ~ 
~~ damages, argues the SG, the suit is authorized by the savings 
clause. The suit is preempted, however, if the act ion is for 
punitive damages or for injunctive relief to force an abatemen~ 
of the pollution.2 
The first part the SG's claim is similar to that raised by 
petr. Amicus argues that the issuance of an injunction would 
conflict with the FWPCA because it would allow affected states to 
impose their own discharge standards on the source, regardless of I the wishes of the EPA or the source state. The FWPCA forbids an 
effort by affected states to supplement the federal permit 
requirements, but this is precisely the result of a Vt 
injunction. The Vt de rejected this argument, finding that an 
abatement remedy would not interfere with the Act because the 
goal of both the FWPCA and a nuisance suit is to prevent 
pollution. The SG argues that this conclusion is misguided: 
simply because the goal of a state law is consistent with the 
2The SG further qualifies the rule by stating that any 
suit may be brought under Vt law if the New York "choice 
of law" statute so provides. The parties spend some time 
discussing the effect of the different choice of law 
rules, without shedding much light on how this case should 
be resolved. I do not discuss the choice of law issue in 
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federal law does not mean that there is no conflict. A state law 
also is preempted if it conflicts with the federal statutory 
mechanisms designed to meet that goal. See Michigan Canners & 
Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 
U.S. 461, 477 (1984): SG Brief at 21-22. 
The SG does not claim that all suits are similarly barred, 
even though it concedes there is "considerable force" to the 
argument that "actions" should be preempted vel non, rather than 
individual remedies. The SG maintains that while injunctive 
remedies should be preempted, compensatory damages should be 
recoverable under Vt common law. The distinction, said the SG, 
is that compensatory damages do not "regulate" the behavior of a 
source, and thus ~ not interfere with the federal/source-state 
partnership contemplated by the FWPCA. In theory the only role 
of compensatory damages is to require a source to pay for the 
external costs it creates by its pollution. Because these 
damages do not give a source a significant incentive to change 
its behavior, they are not inconsistent with the FWPCA's ability 
to regulate pollution. 
Punitive damages, on the other hand, encourage the source to 
alter its conduct. The SG argues that if an affected state has 
the power to punish a source, it effectively is regulating that 
source's discharge level. Punitive damages therefore are more 
like injunctive relief than like compensatory damages, and 
accordingly should not be allowed in any action except those 
under NY law. 
- - 15. 
The SG proposes a neat solution, but not a perfect one. 
~ 
The f3 u.,,:f 
~ 
biggest problem is that there is no support for this division of 
remedies in the statute or legislative history. The second 









artificial. The difference to the sourc~ -
to compensate and paying to atone for 
~f 
outrageous behavior is one of degree, not kind. While 
compensatory damages are easier to quantify and therefore create 
less uncertainty, the result to the source is the same: it must 
pay higher costs to conduct the same business than it would 
absent the liability. If IPC, for example, has to pay huge 
amounts of compensatory damages, it presumably will change its 
business practices or water treatment system so that it will 
I discharge fewer effluents than it did before the nuisance suit 
was filed. It is unclear why this incentive is not "regulatory" 
as well. 
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
The best argument for each position is easy to summarize. 
~ claim that the plain language of the savings clause 
preserves a common law suit under Vt law, and that there is no 
indication that the FWPCA preempts such a suit. 
other hand, say that common law suits will be so disruptive of 
the regulatory scheme established by statute that Congress must 
have intended to restrict state actions to source-state courts. 
The @ agrees that Vt has jurisdiction to consider claims for 
compensatory damages, but argues that injunctive relief or 
• 
- - 16. 
punitive damages ultimately regulate the source's conduct and 
interfere with the permit system, and therefore are preempted. 
It is easy to attack or defend each of these positions. 
I do not know what the right answer is in this case. The SG 
presents the most attractive solution for this particular 
dispute, but I am afraid that an attempt to distinguish among 
remedies will cause confusion among lower courts in subsequent 
preemption decisions. If the Court adopts the SG's 
recommendations, it may be prudent to emphasize that "splitting" 
remedies for preemption purposes is not favored. I also am 
dubious about the substantive difference between compensatory and 
punitive damages. Given the complete lack of statutory authority 
for the SG's position, this type of distinction perhaps should be !E;:;::;; 
> 
drawn by Congress rather than the courts. ~ 
I tentatively recommend that the Court find in favor of ~ 
petr, and rule that common law actions from affected states are ~ 
preempted. Despite the clear language of the savings clause, it ~ 
would be illogical for Congress to have preserved the right to .._ _________ . 
evade the careful dictates of the FWPCA. If Vt courts may issue 
~
an injunction to prevent further discharge from a NY source, the 
permit system is nullified. If IPC is held liable for $100 
million in damages -- despite its compliance with the federal and 
NY permits -- the regulatory scheme has been frustrated. As the 
Court stated in Milwaukee II: 
The fact that the language of [the savings clause] is 
repeated in haec verba in the citizen suit prov1s1ons 





that it does not reflect any considered judgment about 
what remedies were previously available or continue to 
be available under any particular act. 451 U.S. at 329 
n. 22 (emphasis added). 
17. 
The Court should not read the savings clause so literally that it 
leads to a result inconsistent with the rest of the FWPCA. 
I recommend that the decision of the CA2 be reversed . 
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November 4, 1986 
International Paper v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233 
This case involves the preemptive effect of the federal 
permit system for water pollution control on the common law of 
ron-source states. You asked me to determine which bodies of 
water were subject to the permit requirement. The shor t answer: 
all of them. A permit is required before a source may discharge 
pollution into any navigable water. The Clean Water Act defines 
"navigable water" to mean "the waters of the United States" 33 
u.s.c. §1362(7). The word "navigable" was intentionally omitted 
from the definition, in order to give the Act the widest possible 
scope. See R. Zener, Guide to Federal Environmental Law, 62 and 
n. 3 (1981) (citing legislative history). The Act would appear 
to cover even intra-state rivers and lakes. Thus any source that 
discharges into the Mississippi River, Lake Champlain, or small 
streams has to get a permit. The concerns about subjecting these 
sources to conflicting laws from affected states remains. 
~ 1233 
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International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233 
~~~ 
Question Presented 
The case involves preemptive effect of Fed. Water Pollution 
Control Act. Question is whether Vermont courts may apply Vt. 
law in suit against NY pollution source. 
I. 
A. Procedural History 
(1) identity of parties, beginning of dispute 
(2) decision of Vt. de, conflict with Milwaukee III (CA7} 
(3) granted cert; now affirm decision not to dismiss, but modify 
opinion below; must apply law of the source state 
B. Regulatory Background 
(1) Law is ambiguous on what law controlled before 1970s; federal 
c/1 (Hinderlider}, then suggestion of state law {Wyandotte} 
(2) Milwaukee I decision -- federal c/1 applied 
(3) Amendments to FWPCA, then Milwaukee II -- no more fed. c/1 
(4) description of FWPCA structure 
a) requirement of federal permit 
b) option of source state to impose higher requirements 
c} lesser role for affected states 
II. 
(1) When will federal statute preempt state law? 
' 
, -
(2} is there preemption here? (emphasis on comprehensive 
structure of Act} 
(3} there is tension between preemptive scope and plain language 
of savings clause (SC) 
a} must be some content to SC; "any person, any law" 
b} Vt de and CA2 ruled that SC should be read to allow 
affected states to impose own laws 
(4) Although a close case, cannot read SC that broadly 
a) Congress could not have intended to let SC interfere with 
goals and structure of Act 
b) this would be result if allowed Vt law to apply 
(5) DC reading conflicts with permit system 
a) conflicts single source to a variety of laws 
b) would give affected states control over discharge 
c) interferes with federal/source state partnership 
d) (possibly footnote?) SG argues that should distinguish 
between remedies; no support in the statute for the position 
e) conclusion: can't impose affected state law on source state 
(6) Question remains as to what state actions are not preempted 
a) at minimum, can sue in source state under source state law; 
this applies whether injured party is resident of Vt or NY 
'(,.~ A ~ lso can sue if NY law itself requires application of 




Summary: decision not to grant summary judgment is affirmed; 
resp may sue in Vt de, but only if use NY law. 
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s with respect to the waters 
,undary waters) of such states. 
ests that because the discharg-
1sin and Indiana cause an ad-
Sav1/IJJ e~ ~OVIJ'/c?Y? ct 
- /JcA rw T/ J 
except tor prov1s10ns 1::xJJn:::,::,1_y .I:'' v.c-., .. , 6 
the interests of other states, and in the 
light of the conflict and confusion which 
cou d resu t rom any different construc-
tion, we cone ude t at t 1s provisio refers 
~1}to the right_ o~ a state with respect to 
f .. ~ ischarges w1thm that state, and not to any 
c), Y- right of a state to impose more stringent 
_ ,_ A.,btMimitations upon discharges in another 
111/"!'J~ state. 
tp-J Section 1370(2) requires that except as 
}-t, expressly provided nothing in FWPCA 
> ~ shall be construed as impairing or in any 
/J-.j-~' manner affecting any right or jurisdiction 
the competing claims of states in the environ-
mental quality of interstate waters. Illinois' 
failure to participate in that process cannot now 
justify unilateral application of Illinois law to 
these discharges. If Illinois desires more strin-
gent protection from out-of-state discharges, it 
must turn in the first instance to the EPA and 
federal law for the equitable accommodation of 
its interests. 
@on its face it is arguable that § 1370 contem-
plates only legislatively or administratively pre-
scribed state standards. The Supreme Court 
has suggested. however, that it may refer to 
effluent limitations imposed as a result of court 
decrees under the common law of nuisance. 
In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA 
Amendments of 1972 stated with respect to 
the saving clause: 
Hit should be noted, however, that the section 
would specifically preserve any rights or rem-
edies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would re-
main available. Compliance with require-
ments under this Act would not be a defense 
to a common law action for pollution dam-
ages." S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
within the boundary waters of 
provision saves its jurisdiction 
laws so as to regulate activity 
1 and Indiana in order to avoid 
the future. We read Milwau-
ding that Illinois law could not 
his situation so that there was 
urisdiction to be saved. In any 
he light of the structure _gf 
I the potential conflict and con-
think Congress intended no 
wore than to save the ri~ht and jurisdiction 
of a state to regulate activity occurrjog 
~ithin the confines of its boundary waters.7 
Subsection (e~ of § 1365, authorizing a 
suit for enforcement in the federal judicial 
district in which the source is located, con-
tains similar saying clause language: 
Nothing in this section shall restrict any 
right which any person (or class of per-
sons) may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
Sec also S.Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 ( 1971) 
(Report on the MPRSA) (the citizen-suit provi-
sion docs not restrict or supersede "any other 
right to legal action which is afforded the 
potential litigant in any other statute or the 
common la"j"), 
It might be argued that the phrase "any 
effluent standard or limitation" in § 505(e) 
(33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)] necessarily is a refer-
:~;~. :~/~~i;::d
0
:d t~~/~!~~ss ::~e~~:: 
ily intended I this meaning. The phrase also 
could refer to state statutory limitations, or to 
"effluent limitations" imposed as a result of 
court decrees under the common law of nui-
sance. 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Nation-
al Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. I. 16 n . 
26, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2624 n. 26, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 
(1981). 
7. Under this interpretation, § 1370(2) is not re• 
duced to a nullity. The provision ensures that 
states retain their power to regulate discharges 
within their "waters (including boundary 




















C/f1 i't- /2 's 3 . 
414 731 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES 
any other relief (including relief against There is nothing to suggest that the ac-
the Administrator or a State agency). tions before us were brought to seek en-
The Supreme Court concluded this forcement of an effluent standard or limita-
'!!:bsection is common language accompa- tion . . In any event we think that the refer-
pying citizensuit P!~~is1ons and ~nee m § 1365(e) to statute or common law, 
means only that the provision- of such hke the reference to right or jurisdiction of 
suit does notrevoke-other remedies . It..,, a state in § 1370, is to a statute or the 
most assuredly°cannot oe· read ·w -mean common law of the state in which the dis-
t~e ~£.~ -~~ ~-~ _hole does .1!9! s~ppla!'t-charge occurs.M 
formerly available federal common-law 
actions but only that the -particular sec- VI. CONCLUSION 
tiorr·a~t:!!~_ri~i~g-~citizen _suits ·does · nor cto A . 
8
~ --- - · ·· - -- . Milwaukee Case 
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 329, 101 S.Ct. at 
1798. 
This provision may well preserve a right 
under statutes or the common law of the 
state within which a discharge occurs 
(State I) to obtain enforcement of pre-
scribed standards or limitations, and we see 
no reason why such a right could not be 
asserted by an out-of-state plaintiff injured 
as a result of the violation. However, it 
seems implausible that Congress meant to 
pr~rve or confer any iight of the state 
claiming mJury (State II) or Its citizens ro 
seek en!orcement of limitations on d1s-
c'flarges m State_f by a_pplying the statutes 
or common law of State II . Such a com-
plex scheme of mt.erst.ate regulation \\iould 
undermine tlieuniformity and state cooper-
ation env1s1oned oy the Act. For a number 
of a1fferent states to have independent and 
plenary regulatory authority over a single 
discharge would lead to chaotic confronta-
tion betwaen ~ erajgn states. Dischar-
gers woul be forced to meet not only the 
statutory limitations of all states potential-
ly affected by their discharges but also the 
common law standards developed through 
case law of those states. It would be virtu-
ally impossible to predict the standard for a 
lawful discharge into an interstate body of 
water. Any permit issued under the Act 
would be rendered meaningless. In our 
opinion Congress could not have intended 
such a result. 
8. This construction is consislent with this 
court's former reading of the saving clause. In 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th 
Cir.1977) we said, NCongress has chosen not to 
Illinois asks us to affirm the district 
court judgment on the basis of the Illinois 
state law claims. It has not sought to 
enforce an effluent limitation under Wis-
consin statutory or common law nor sought 
to enforce federal limitations as provided 
for under the 1972 FWPCA. Because we 
hold that the logic of Milwaukee I and 
Milwaukee II and the 1972 FWPCA pre-
clude the type of application of state law 
sought by Illinois in the area of interstate 
water pollution, the judgment of the dis-
trict court is reversed and the case remand-
ed for dismissal. 
B. Illinois v. Hammond 
The pleadings in this case and the Scott 
case make it clear that the causes of action 
asserted rely on the application of Illinois 
statutory and common law. Nothing in the 
pleadings suggests a resort to Indiana law 
or the 1972 FWPCA. The order of the 
district court is reversed and the case re-
manded for dismissal. 
C. Scott v. Hammond 
There is an additional reason for dismiss-
al of the Scott complaint, apart from the 
preclusive effect of 1972 FWPCA on a 
cause of action based on the Illinois law of 
nuisance. He has not alleged harm of a 
kind different from that suffered by other 
members of the public exercising the right 
common to the general public which was 
preempt state regulation when the state has 
decided to force its industry 10 create new and 


















November 17, 1986 
85-1233 International Paper v. Ouellette 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The Chief Justice has assigned the above case to me 
to draft a Court opinion. I will be happy to undertake this 
if there is a majority for the view I expressed at Confer-
ence. 
My Conference notes indicate that all nine of us 
voted to affirm in whole or in part. As the Chief Justice 
noted he would .. affirro and modify". The principal question, ', 
as I view the case, is whether - and to what extent if any - 1 
federal law has preempted state law. In my view the Dis- 1 
trict Court in Vermont had jurisdiction to try this case, 
but could apply only New York state law in addition to fed-
eral law. The only applicable state law in a case of this 
kind is that of the source st~te. If this view Prevails, we 
would affirm as modified, and the case would be remanded for : 
trial. Our opinion would make clear that the Vermont common 
law of nuisance is not applicable. 
I believe there are at least five votes for the 
foregoing view, but before undertaking an opinion I would 
like to confirm this understanding. 1 would appreciate 
hearing from you. 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 
- -
;§u:pum:t (!Jen.rt ttf tlrt ~th _jtab.&' 
~~. ~- QJ. 2llffe~~ 
CHAMB ER S OF 
JUSTI C E B Y RON R . WHI T E 
November 17 , 1986 
85- 1233 - International Paper v. Ouelette 
Dear Lewis , 
I agree with your views that this case 
may be tried in Vermont and that the 
applicable law is that of New York. 
Sincerely yours , 
~~ 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
• - -
.itt.;trttttt (!J:itttrl cf l4t ~itt~ .italtg 
~ail lfinghm. J. (!J:. 2llffe~, 
~ ---
CHAMBERS OF 
J UST ICE A N TONIN SCA LIA 9 ~ ~ November 18, 1986 
~~~~4,f~ 
Nt> . 85-1233 - ) International Paper v. Ouellette ~ 'J RE: 
7 ~J/'k., 
Dear Lewis: ~~-
My view is that the federal district court in Vermont 
could not apply Vermont law, but could apply New York law. 
There are various routes to this result, and I am unlikely 
to stick upon which route you choose. In fact, I confess 
to have altered my own position several times. It seems 
to me, however, that the following analysis is the most 
honest: 
(1) Milwaukee I held that federal common law governs 
interstate pollution -- and the opinion meant to displace 
both the receiving state's and the source state's law. 
(Though I suppose it could be said that on l y the former was 
necessary to the decision, I cannot imagine a court-created 
rule to the effect that both a federal common-law nuisance 
remedy and a Wisconsin nuisance remedy were available.) 
Zl/ 
(2) Milwaukee II held that the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act supplants federal common law, but did not reach 
the issue "whether state law is also available," 451 U.S., 
at 310 n.4 . I would read that reservation as leaving open 
the question whether the FWPCA overruled Milwaukee I so as 
to allow certain state remedies. 
(3) 33 U.S.C. §1370 provides that the FWPCA does not 
"in any manner affect[] any right or jurisdiction of the 
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) 
of such States" (emphasis added). In my view, this does 
not preclude any effect of the Act upon Milwaukee I, which 
dealt not with the jurisdiction of the states over their own 
waters~ut with their jurisdiction over the waters of other 
states -- that is, Illinois' jurisdiction to reach acts of 
pollution occurring in Wisconsin waters, and Wisconsin's 
jurisdiction to compensate or prevent damage occurring in 
Illinois waters. I would find in the Act clear indication 
that Milwaukee I is to be adhered to insofar as jurisdiction 
of receiving states is concerned, and is to be departed from 
insofar as jurisdiction of source states is concerned, re-
turning to source states the power to provide damages for 
-
November 18, 1986 
Page two 
-
injury done elsewhere. I find the former (the intent not 
to alter Milwaukee I's exclusion of jurisdiction of the 
receiving states) in those provisions that give receiving 
states a purely advisory role in the setting of standards; 
it would be entirely inconsistent to allow them to trump the 
standards by adopting stricter standards for damage actions 
against out-of-state pollution. And I find the latter (the 
intent to alter Milwaukee I's e xclusion of the jurisdiction 
of the source states) both in the recognition that standards 
prescribed by the source states will affect receiving states, 
and in the permission for source states to adopt higher 
pollution criteria for in-state damage actions. There is no 
conceivable reason why the latter should apply only in-state 





Copies to the Conference 
- -
CH A MBERS O F 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
j;~utttt C!j:llltd ttf f4t ~ttitth j;faft,« 
'Jla,g4htgfott. ~. C!J:. 2llffe~~ 
November 18, 1986 
Re: 85-1233 International Paper v. Ouellette 
Dear Lewis, 
✓ 
I agree with you that the Vermont common 
law of nuisance is inapplicable in this case 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
-- " 
j,uvr~m:t <!}O'ltrl of ttr~ ~h ~taJ:tg 
JlagJri:ttgtott. ~. (!}. 2.tJffeJJ,, ✓ 
November 19, 1986 
Re: No. 85-1233, International Paper Co . v . Ouellette 
Dear Lewis: 
I find myself in disagreement with your position. I 
continue to believe that the FWPCA does not pre-empt non-
source state nuisance law and that the normal choice of law 
principles should apply in this case. At the very least, 
if New York law is to be applied, that law should include 
the New York choice of law principles which seem to me , for 




cc: The Conference 
- -
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: No. 85-1233 
Dear Lewis, 
.,iu.p:rmu <!fond of iltt ~ft~ j;tattg 
,rrudp:ttghttt. ,. C!f. 2llffe'l,,;l 
November 18, 1986 
International Paper v. Ouelette 
✓ 
I am in substantial agreement with your views in this case. 
Sincerely ~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
- -.t'nprtntt Qlauri d tfrt ~b j\taits 
.. ulfinghtn. ~- QI. 2Llffe'l, 
C H AMl5ER9 OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
November 18, 1986 
Re: No. 85-1233 - International Paper v. 
Ouellette 
Dear Lewis, 
I adhere to my view that the federal Water 
Pollution Control Act does not alter choice of law 
principles. Thus the District Court in Vermont 
should apply Vermont law if this is consistent 
with traditional choice of law rules. If, 
however, a majority of the Court concludes that 









JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§u:punu ~llttrl ttf tfrt ~ttitt~ .§brltll 
._-ag.fringhm. ~. ~ 2.llffe'!J 
November 24, 1986 




At present I do not believe there is any federal 
rule of law that preempts Vermont's common law of 
nuisance while preserving New York's. More 
importantly, I am very much opposed to fashioning a 
new rule of law any sooner than necessary. The only 
judgment under review is an affirmance of the 
District Court's order denying the defendant's motion 
to dismiss. There has been no showing that there is 
any difference between New York and Vermont law. It 
is, accordingly, not necessary to write an advisory 
opinion on this subject at this stage of the 
litigation. 
In my opinion, the fact that we may have granted 
certiorari improvidently is not an adequate 
justification for abandoning normal rules of judicial 
restraint. In short, although you may persuade me 
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.:§u:µum.t <!}amt ttf tltt ~b .:§htfta 
'maafringLrn. ~. <!}. 2.0ffe'!,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
November 24, 1986 
Re: No. 85-1233-International Paper v. Quellette 
Dear Lewis: 
I lean toward the views expressed in John Stevens' 






cc: The Conference 
~ r 
./ i .1. (!_ 
~ I /z 7 
~ ~ ~ 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233 
This case involves the preemptive scope of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 33 u.s.c. §1251 et 
~- (FWPCA or Act). The question presented is whether 
the Act preempts a common-law nuisance suit filed in a 
Vermont Court under Vermont law, when the source of the 
alleged injury is located in New York. 
I 
Lake Champlain forms part of the border between the 
states of New York and Vermont. Petitioner International 
Paper Company (IPC) operates a pulp and paper mill on the 
New York side of the Lake. In the course of its business 
IPC discharges a variety of effluents into the Lake 
'-
2. 
through a diffusion pipe. The pipe runs from the mill 
through the water toward Vermont, ending a short distance ~✓ 
~ before the state boundary line that divides the Lake_:; 










or lease land on the Vermont shore. In 1978 the owners 
filed a class action suit against IPC, claiming that the 
discharge of effluents constituted a "continuing nuisance" 
under Vermont common law. Responderits alleged, inter 
alia, that the pollutants made the water "foul, unhealthy, 
smelly, and ••• unfit for recreational use," thereby 
diminishing the value of their property. App. 29. The 
owners asked for $20 million in compensatory damages, $100 
million in punitive damages, and injunctive relief that 
would require IPC to restructure part of its water 
t,,.tr4' ~ 
+-" z,,v" '<, &v' ~ 




treatment system. 1 The action originally was filed in 
State Superior Court, and then later was removed to 
Vermont Federal District Court. 
IPC moved for judgment on the pleadings and summary 
judgment, claiming that respondent's suit was preempted by 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. With the 
parties' consent, the District Judge deferred a ruling on 
~~Uz_ 
the motion pending the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal~ 
/\ 
~ in a similar case involving Illinois and the city 
of Milwaukee. In that dispute, Illinois filed a nuisance 
action against the city under Illinois statutory and 
common law, seeking to abate the alleged pollution of Lake 
1 The complaint also r~estog~{fr-y and injunctive relief 
for air pollution allegedly~ caused by the IPC mill. App. 35-36. 
This claim is not before the Court. 
4. 
Michigan. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (CA7 1984) 
(Milwaukee III), cert. denied sub nom., Scott v. City of 




claim, finding that the ~--
FWPCA precluded the application of one state's law against 
a pollution source located in a different State. The 
decision was based in part on the Court's conclusion that 
the application of different state laws to a single "point 
source"2 would interfere~arefully devised 
~ 
regulatory system established by the FWPCA. Id., at 414. 
~ 
The Se-vent-b.--Gircuit concluded that the only suits that 
A 
were not preempted were those alleging violations of the 
err-~ 
laws of the polluting State. Id., at 413. 
A 
2 A "point source" is defined by the FWPCA as "any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance •.. from which pollutants are or 
may be discharged." §502(14), 33 u.s.c. §1362(14); see 40 CFR 
(Footnote continued) 
5. 
IPC argued that the holding in Milwaukee III was 
dispositive in this case. The Vermont District Court 
disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss. Ouellette v. 
International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (Vt. 1985). The 
~ 
\,-Dist£±ct .,Judgp acknowledged that interstate water 
A y~ 
pollution normally is governed by federal law. He found, 
~ 
however, that two sections of the FWPCA explicitly 
preserve state-law rights of action. First, §510 of the 
Act provides: 
"[Except as expressly provided] nothing in this 
chapter shall ••• be construed as impairing or 
in any manner affecting any right or 
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the 
waters (including boundary waters) of such 
States." 33 u.s.c. §1370. 
In addition, §505(e) states that 
(Footnote 2 
§122.2 (1986). T~ 
within the meaning of 
j 
9 f ~ /),U) -1-
con ti ed fro previous page) 
-i-s-n-e isput?that IPC is a point source 
the Act. 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may 
have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or 
limitation or to seek any other relief .••• " 33 
U.S. C. § 13 6 5 ( e) • 
The District Court held that these two provisions 
6. 
(together, "the saving clause") made it clear th~t federal 







V ~~- H' p 
~ /,. /l' k 
,.-0~ Jr 
\~,,vt-0( 
law did not preempt entirely the rights of States to 
control pollution. Therefore the question presented, said 
the {ourt, was which types of state suits Congress 
intended to preserve. T~ Courtftonsidered three 
~ 
possibilities:3 first, the saving clause could be 
construed to preserve state law only as it applied to 
waters not covered by the FWPCA. But since the Act 
~ 
/11"'1 
3 For a discussion of each of the three interpretations of the 
saving clause, see Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The 
Demise of the Federal Common Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wisc. 
L. Rev. 627, 664-671. 
7. 
applies to virtually all surface water in the country, 4 
the District Court summarily rejected this possibility. 
Second, the saving clause might preserve state nuisance 
~ ;,_ ~ y 1 1 . 1 . d . h ' . th . th ~- aw on y as it app ies to isc arges occurring wi in e 
~ -h> 
cJ..c- . 
9 ;v .~ . same state; under this view a claim could be filed against 
~~ ,,?l ~~~-t:,J> IPC under New York law, but not under Vermont law. This 
jv4' _,;;;--- . {.-Kea• dlq;i£5 ~~ t>--( ~ j-uv-~ 
was the position adopted~y th~Seventh Circuit in 
Milwaukee III. The Vermont Court nevertheless rejected 
this option, finding that "there is simply nothing in the 
Act which suggests that Congress intended to impose such 
4 While the Act purports to regulate only "navigable waters," 
this term essentially covers all surface bodies of water, even if 
they are not navigable in the traditional sense. See FWPCA 
§502(7), 33 u.s.c. §1362(7) (defining navigable waters as "the 
waters of the United States"); 1 Legislative History of FWPCA 
Amendments of 1972, at 250 (House Consideration of Conference 
Committee Report). See also United States v. Ashland Oil & 
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1324-1325 (CA6 1974) (requiring 
permit for non-navigable tributary). 
8. 
limitations on the use of state law." 602 F. Supp., at 
269. 
The District Court therefore adopted the third 
interpretation of the saving clause, and held that a state 
action to redress interstate water pollution could be 
~ 
maintained under the law of~ state in which the injury 
A 
occurred. Ibid. The)fuurt was unpersuaded by the concern 
expressed in Milwaukee III that the application of out-of-
state law to a point source would conflict with the FWPCA. 
There was no interference with the procedures established 
by Congress, said the District Court, because a State's 
"imposition of compensatory damage awards and other 
equitable relief for injuries caused .•. merely supplement 
the standards and limitations imposed by the Act." Id., 
at 271 (emphasis in original). The fourt also found that 
9. 
the use of state law did not conflict with the ultimate 
goal of the FWPCA, since in each case the objective was to 
decrease the level of pollution. Ibid. --
The District Court certified its decision for 
c.o....,,._.,,,,1- o-f ~~ 
interlocutory appeal, see 28 u.s.c. §1292(b), and the~ ~M..r.. 
,1 ' Cd IU 21?-i- dL:r 
Second Circuit aff irnrea·for the reasons stated by the 
~ -
~r 
District Judqe. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 776 
F. 2d 55, 56 (CA2 19 8 5) (per cur iam) • We granted 
~/-
certiorari to resolve the~conflict a€tween the Second an~ 
d-" the Seuen..th C4-t:-e4:l-i.ts on this important issue of federal 
preemption. U.S. (1986). We now affirm the 
denial of !PC's motion to dismiss, but reverse the~ 
~ 
~ decisionito the extent it permits the application 
of Vermont law to this litigation. For the reasor~ 
::t.J :ttted be I O.W... lde hold that when a court considers a 
10. 
,14..&.-f vt- ~/- 1-v ~ r u) PC ,4_). 
state-law claim concerning interstate water pollution, -i-t--
~ 
c.-efl-vvr 




A brief review of the regulatory framework is 
necessary to set the stage for this case. Until fairly 
recently, the use and misuse of interstate water was 
governed primarily by federal common law. See,~, 
Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) 
(water apportionment); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 
(1906) (water pollution) .s This principle was called into 
question in 1971, however, when the Court suggested in 
5 Accord, North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (air 
pollution); see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S., at 
104-107 (1972) (Milwaukee I); Glicksman, Federal Preemption and 
Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 
152-155 (1985); Note, City of Milwaukee, supra, 630-636. 
I 
~~-9 




dicta that an interstate dispute between a state and a 
private company should be resolved by reference to state 
nuisance law. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 
493, 499 n. 3 ("an action such as this, if otherwise 
cognizable in federal district court, would have to be 
adjudicated under state law" (citing Erie)). 
In 1972 we had occasion to address this issue in the 
first of two Supreme Court cases involving the dispute 
between Illinois and Milwaukee . In Milwaukee I, the State 
moved to file an original action in this Court, seeking to 
enjoin the city from discharging sewerage into Lake 
Michigan. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 
(1972). The Court's opinion in that case affirmed the 
~ 
ne-t4e-fl that the regulation of interstate water pollution 
A 
is primarily a matter of federal, not state, law, thus 
12. 
overruling the contrary suggestion in Wyandotte. 6 406 
U.S., at 102 n. 3. The Court was concerned, however, that 
the existing version of the FWPCA was not sufficiently 
comprehensive to resolve all interstate disputes that were 
likely to arise. Milwaukee I therefore held that these 
cases should be resolved by reference to federal common 
law; the implicit corollary of this ruling was that state 
common law was preempted. See Id., at 107 n. 9; Milwaukee 
III, 731 F. 2d, at 407. The Court noted, though, that 
future action by Congress to regulate water pollution 
might preempt federal common law as well. 406 U.S., at 
107. 
6 Although the Court's opinion could be read asfa:s~uishing 
rather than overruling that part of Wyandotte,~ulater decision 
made it clear that state common law did not survive Milwaukee I. 
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 327 n. 19 (1981); see also, 
Glicksman, Federal Preemption, supra, at 156 n. 176. 
13. 
2 ShortlE00 Congres~,>aoo~hensive 
amendments to the FWPCA. We considered the impact of the 
new legislation when Illinois and Milwaukee returned to 
the Court several years later.7 City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II). There the 
Court noted that the amendments were a "'complete 
rewriting'" of the statute considered in Milwaukee I, and 
that they were "'the most comprehensive and far reaching'" 
provisions that Congress ever had passed in this area. 
451 U.S., at 317-318 (citations to legislative history 
omitted). Consequently, the Court held that federal 
7 In Milwaukee I the motion to file an original action was 
denied, but we ruled that Illinois could maintain an action in 
federal district court. The State then filed suit in Illinois 
District Court, alleging that the City was liable for creating a 
public nuisance under both federal and Illinois common law. The 
compl aint also alleged a violation of the State Environmental 
Protection Act. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S., at 310 and n. 4.; see 
Milwaukee III, 751 F. 2d, at 404. 
14. 
/l ,_ . ~ ,k ;,,t-




legislation now occupied the field,-preempting all federal .l!lfl!P 
~~ 
~ l. L 
common law. The Court left open the question of whether .~6~ 
/ J 
injured parties still had a cause of action under state_) 
j./ 
law. Id., at 310 n. 4. Therefore the case was remanded 
for further consideration; the result on remand was the 
Seventh Circuit decision in Milwaukee III, discussed 
supra. 
One of the key features of the 1972 amendments is the 
establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System CNPDES), a federal permit program 
designed to regulate the discharge of polluting effluents. 
FWPCA §402, 33 u.s.c. §1342; see generally EPA v. State 
Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 205-208 
(1976) {describing NPDES system). Section 301 of the Act 
generally prohibits the discharge of any effluent into a 
15. 
navigable body of water unless the source has obtained an 
NPDES permit from the Environmental Protection Agency. 
The permits establish detailed effluent discharge 
~ 
standards and a compliance schedule for each source. ~ 
,re/~ 
The amendments also recognize that the States should 
have a significant role in protecting their own natural 
resources. §lOl(b), 33 U.S.C. §125l(b). Therefore if the 
------
State in which a point source is located (the source 
State) wishes to impose more stringent discharge levels, 
the Act authorizes that State to impose its own permit 
requirement. §402(b), 33 u.s.c. §1342(b). The state 
standards are subject to EPA approval, but once this 
approval is obtained the State becomes the primary 
regulating authority, and the federal permit requirements 
are superseded. §402(c), 33 U.S.C. §1342(c). Thus while 
µ...v (1 _.e. 
~ 
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16. 
~ ~ ,,,t..~~1 ~ 
4~~1-
the FWPCA establishes a regulatory "partnership" between 
~ 
the federal government and the source ~-e,a.c.h point 
standards. 
~ 
is required to meet a single set of discharge 
~ 
Wh 'l St t ~ ~.t-l ' ' 1 ' '/ 1 e source a es U-Et--V't a strong voice 1n regu at1ng , 
I\ 
their own pollution, the FWPCA contemplates a much lesser 
role for States that share an interstate waterway with the 
source (the affected States). Even though it may be 
harmed by the discharges, an affected State only has an 
advisory role in regulating pollution that originates 
beyond its borders. Before a federal permit may be 
issued, each affected State is given notice and the 
opportunity to object to the proposed standards at a 
public interest hearing. §40l(a) (2), 33 U.S.C. 
§134l(a) (2); Milwaukee III, 731 F. 2d, at 412 • . An 
17. 
affected State has similar rights to be consulted before 
the source state issues its own permit; the source State 
must send notification, and must consider the objections 
and recommendations of the affected States before taking 
action. 8 §402(b); 33 u.s.c. §1342(b). Significantly, 
however, an affected State does not have concurrent 
authority for setting the final standards, since it may 
not block the issuance of the permit on its own. Cf. 
§402(b) (5); 33 u.s.c. §1342l(b) (5). Also, an affected 
state may not establish a separate permit system to 
8 For a more detailed description of the permitting system, see 
R. Zener, Guide to Federal Environmental Law 61-88 (1981). 
Although the record in this case is unclear, it appears that 
during the time relevant to this case IPC was operating under a 
federal NPDES permit. App. 29-30. A draft of the permit was 
submitted to Vermont as an affected State, and the State plus 
other interested parties objected to the proposed discharge 
standards. Id., at 65-66. The EPA held a hearing that 
apparently was attended by IPC and at least some of property 
owners. 
f-}-,._ C P fl a.,,../-J ? 9 rt...v,,,,,, 1./- vt...,. 'l-t q 
~ fpA,"-d..A-'1/.,tbv ~ ~ ~ ~ 
18. 
regulate an out-of-state source. Lake Erie Alliance for 
Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1074-1075 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 
707 F.2d 1392 (CA3 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 
(1983); State v. Champion International Corp., 709 S.W. 
2d. 569 (Tenn. 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-57. Thus the 
Act makes it clear that affected States occupy a 





JI- ~;...__ ~ 
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With this regulatory framework in mind, we turn to 
the~ issue presented: whether the Act preempts Vermont 
common law to the extent that law may impose liability on 
a New York point source. We begin the analysis by noting 
that it is not necessary for a federal statute to provide 
19. 
explicitly that particular state laws are preempted. 
Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical 
Laboratories, U.S. ---' (1985). Although 
preemption will not be inferred lightly,9 it may be 
presumed when the federal legislation is "sufficiently 
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that 
. ., 
Congress 'left no room' for supplementary regulation." 
Ibid., (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)). Also, a state law is preempted if it 
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Ibid., 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
9 See Rice v. Sante Fe Electric Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) 
<"we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of 
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"); Milwaukee 
II, 451 U.S., at 312; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 




As we noted in Milwaukee II, Hter~Ts m::, question:::::5-
~ tha-t the 1972 Act amendments were designed to bring about 
a comprehensive and far-reaching revision of water 
pollution regulation. 451 U.S., at 318 and n. 12. ~ 
~1uring the Congressional debate one Senator 
-
described the provisions as the "most comprehensive 
legislation ever developed in its field." Id., at 318 
(citation to legislative history omitted). Even a cursory -
review of the amendments supports this characterization. 
The Act applies to all point sources and virtually all 
bodies of water, and it sets forth the procedures for 
obtaining a permit in great detail. The FWPCA also 
provides its own remedies, including civil and criminal 
fines for permit violations, and "citizen suits" that 
allow individuals (including those from affected states) 
\ . 
21. 
to compel the EPA to enforce a permit. lO Given this, and 
given our prior ruling that the control of interstate 
pollution is primarily a matter of federal law, Milwaukee 
_!_, 406 U.S., at 107, it seems clear that an injured party 
must look to the Act to discover what remedies are 
available. 
This conclusion does not end out inquiryL ~ 
-1-o 
because while Congress plainly intended dominate the field 
/\ 
~
of pollution regulation, the saving clause SflOWS that it 
A 
a..-c..h-ifJA- -
did not want to eliminate all other play&s. Respondents 
d irr tlJj, sae-e argue that the saving clause provides the 
necessary federal authorization for their claim, since the 
lO §309 (a), 33 u.s.c. §1319 (a); §505 (a), (h), 33 u.s.c. 
§1365(a) ,(h); see generally, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1980) 
(discussing "elaborate" remedial provisions). ~ 
22. 
clause preserves both the State's right to regulate its 
waters and an injured party's right to seek relief under 
"any statute or common law." §505 (e); 33 u.s.c. §1365 (e) 
M-1..c 
{emphasis added). There~ is language in the 
I\ 
legislative history to support this broad interpretation. 
A Senate Report accompanying the amendments says: "if 
damages could be shown, other remedies [besides a citizen 
suit] would remain available. Compliance with 
requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a 
common law action for pollution damages." s. Rep. No. 92-
414, at 81. Moreover, respondents note that after 
reviewing the legislative history, the District Court 
found no evidence that Congress intended to alter 
U.-0-f-
traditional tort law doctrine, ~ allows a party to 
-'\ 











Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258-259 (1933). In light of 
" \\ 
the plain meaning of the saving clause, it is argued, a 
.I\ /\. 
federal court sitting in Vermont must be allowed to apply 
the law of that state. See Klaxon v. Stenor Electric Co., 
313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
vi,..4.-.,,~ 
Although we agree that Congress me-aft-t: to preserve 
;\ 
~~· 
some state suits, we cannot accept th-:i:-s expansive reading 
,1 
of the saving clause. As wi th any statutory 
interpretation question, the Court must be guided by the 
goals and policies of the entire Act, rather than by a 
single sentence or Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 
~ £k_ f-
u. s. 707, 713 (1975). After examining~t--h-e--F-WP€A as a 
~d:,i_~~~~~J 
whole, we are convinced that if affected States were 
-\ 
allowed to impose separate discharge standards on a single 
. h ' ' b c:::2.-~ point source, t e 1nev1table result would e ~ 
~ ~F·wP~4 
24. 
interference with the "full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." See Hillsborough, supra, at ~o,-A1r-::;eWe 
do not think~ Congress intended to undermine~ 
~ ~~ 
detaile~ regeflatory statute through a general saving 
'\ 
r:.. ~~ 
clausEy 'fe) hold that the FWPCA pre.eludes a court from 
G ~ '4 a.-- ~~ ~~ 
applying a~')lawAagainst an out-of-state 
source. 
The application of Vermont law to this dispute would 
conflict with the FWPCA in several respects. Most 
significantly, it would allow the affected state to 
circumvent the Act's permit system. As discussed in Part 
II, supra, the FWPCA delegates the authority to set 
discharge level~the EPA and the source state. Before 
~ 
either of these bodies issues a permit it must address a 
host of technical and policy questions, including the 
~-~ '7 ~£<_{"-" ~ - \ 
~ ~  ~~ 5 . ) 
vf -~r ~ / 
~ ~r ~ ~ ? 7 / 
V ~-e~ ",,,,,. ~ ~ 
. "J-7 ~~ ~~ 1-rl-~ . 61-t-<--rf ~ ~ 
.,JJ ' ~current state of technology, a d h w to reconcile the~ 
?/~oposed level of pollution wi 
/0~--~ft u,,,--c.,,,-c-/ (!-'' water. If a New York source 
,~ ~ ~~~ 
'( ' ~ / Vermont law, . J..ov rride 
yr .v ... J; ~ ~ ~ 
requirements nd the policy decisio~ 
~ ~/..LJl- 1'2.../-~ ~ ?'<<f ~ 
ingent dischar e levels than the~ 
- ~-/ .. ~-1-~ ... -· 
){ I .A~, a,?~~:f":5,.ho~he source liable if it fails 
~ .;v I lLsi,~~/l.-1-d;_j-~~~ #~ to reach theset!"~void the threat of continuing 
;Y~_, }h 
y ) would have to cease operations if the affected-state court 
{Y'r '( ./ 
~ x~rordered abatement. We note that this ability to~ 
✓ _), · Y the discharge of an out-of-state source could be exercised 
~/%~ r ~ ll J? 't . . rv". . A . 
)t,ict½' . ...,,or \ 
'If I(/ 
. LY 
change its method of doing business; at worst, the source 
t.-,,.. 
~-A.---t-9-~~u~ 
~ ~ 4 Zoe~ ~ 
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~ ~ 4/-~ ~ ~ ~ - A,,t-J ~-08A tho1:1g"' · ,zin mpliance with a-1-k. 
~k.L~~ 
~S~e and federal permits.11 
The Act plainly does not grant affected States this 
~r 
regulatory power. The FWPeA sets forth in detail the role 
A 
of the affected states in the permit process: they are 
--= 
entitled to,.-notice and a chance to be heard, but otherwise 
they do not have the authority to determine the standards 
that a source must meet. The ruling of the Vermont 
District Court thus would allow the affected states to do 
indirectly what they may not do directly. By holding IPC 
~ 
l--1...., 




11 The rule established by the ;fourt ~elow would have e i-fo&ic a............;. 
e~fec~f allow.ing a;1 affected StaJte to set dischar~ standards tf' 
withou consulting with the source tate, even tho9~h the source 
State t giv~ the affected State he chance to,,comment before 
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27. 
~ ~~~a--~~f-Y' ~~ ~ 
~
/ }lJ ~ ~~~c >fa ~~ 
y" -~~ k4 ~~61 ~ 5~ ~ ~ Court c ' b · · y ,,.. )"?./1~ -. "" c- "r. 
as ~~~r k ~ 
~~ -
s~. It would be 00-0 for Congress, after establishing 
-1 
an elaborate permit system that sets definite discharge 
standards, and after defining the role of both source and 
J-o 
affected states, ?O the1;.{leave the door open to common-law 
~ a_,~~~~ ... ~A-~~ 
suits~that eas  t:Re p .;_crested by 
t~2 
~ ~ ~ 
~1-.J.o. ~ 
~# ~ J 
/(}~ ~ ~ -
~he United States, as amicus curiae, agrees that affected '----( 
~ _J,.,t' states should not have the power to regulate an out-of-state 
~ · point source. But the Government argues that not all claims 
i)., based on affected state law should be precluded. It would draw a 
~ distinction between suits seeking injunctive relief or punitive 
• damages on the one hand, and compensatory damages on the other. 
~ ~he Government suggests that claims seek1ng the former type of 
~ relief may be~ght only under source-state law, while those 
l--v seekin9 ,g~ens~relief may be brought under the law of the 
~ Sta1Ui, ~rj ~~nj.ury occurred. Amicus claims that abatement 
~ · ~•pun~e damages would interfere with the FWPCA because they 
~tb-'Wregj:0-a-te the source's conduct; damages that simply compensate, it 
J 1 /4 argued, only require the source to pay the external costs 
~
rea~he pollution. The Government cites Silkwood v. Kerr-
ry ~ cGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238 (1984), for the proposition that in 
ome cases court might find preemption of certain remedies and 
ot others 
,"1h-~ We decline the government's invitation to draw a line 
µ· / (Footnote continued) 
~ 
~ - 5 ~ ¥{ /"vU..A.f ~ 
.,£. /4-~ ~ ~ ~:...-9 
~ ~-~f-~- ~-
~ ~ ~~ ? 
~ r. ~ a:,..,u 
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~/1 a ¢t '*:11 ,J. 
~~- J3 
l'J,...a../-~~~ -
A second problem created by the decision below is.,1 · 
~ -;pc~ 
~ a source~~l be subject to a variety of common-law 
~ 
rules established by 
0--K__ 




k" source would be responsible for 
t 
complying with the often "vague" and 
"indeterminate" nuisance standards imposed by each 
(Footnote 12 continued from previous page) 
between the types of relief sought. F-ir3~,There is no 
suggestion of such a distinction in either the Act or the 
legislative history. f]fs the Court noted in Silkwood, unless 
/
there is evidence that'Congress meant to preempt a particular 
'1 remedy, it is assumed that the full cause of action under state 
law is available. Id., at 255. SecondJ~~think it would be ~ 
unwise to treat compensatory damages differently in this case, 
given the peculiar nature a nuisance suit. Unlike j-rf many tort 
claims, here there is.u.t~ potential for ongoing liability for a 
continuing injur.lt ~~ ultimately could have the same effect as 
an abatement order . Thus the interference with the FWPCA permit 
system would remain • 
The Government's reliance on Silkwood is misplaced. In that 
case the Court upheld the application of state tort remedies, 
including punitive damages, against an allegation that state 
claims were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. The Court 
refused to distinguish between the types of relief sought, 
despite a claim that punitive damages should be treated 
differently because they have a "regulatory" effect. The opinion 
suggests that if such a distinction is to made, it should be done 
be Congress rather than the Court. Id., at 257-258. 
• d-t_~ ~ ~/41- ~~~I--~/-, d"l-5~ 
:3 ~ ~~ ~v-/  ~ 1../- ~s. 
L--t.- /4_ ~ I- ~ 5 ~ ~ d 




{affected Stat~~ even if those standards impose 
inconsistent or technologically impractical burdens. 13 As 
the Seventh Circuit noted in Milwaukee III: 
"For a number of different states to have 
independent and plenary regulatory authority 
over a single discharge would lead to chaotic 
confrontation between sovereign states. 
Dischargers would be forced to meet not only the 
the statutory limitations of all states 
potentially affected by ~heir discharges but 
also the common law standards developed through 
case law of those states. It would be virtually 
impossible to predict the standard for a lawful 
discharge into an interstate body of water. Any 
permit issued under the Act would be rendered 
meaningless." 731 F. 2d, at 414. 
- 1-tJ ~ ~ ha~f- r vx ~ 
It is extremely unlikely that Congress enwisi~ne~~such a 
I\ 
d-a-a-/-<:c.. t1 ,.µ,.~h-- ' 
l\systeV- The history of the 1972 amendments shows that~ 
l3 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S., at 317 nuisance law is "vague" 
and "indeterminate"); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 571 (4th ed. 1971) 
("There perhaps is no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law 
than that which surrounds the word "nuisance"). The possibility 
that a source will have to meet several different standards is 
relatively small in this case, since Vermont is the only St~ jtrr 
that shares Lake Champlain with New York. Consider, how.es.z.ek,_ a ~~ 
plant that discharges effluents into the Mississippi River. A 
source located in Minnesota theoretically could be subject to the 
common law of any of the nine downstream States. See Webster's 










le · ---½._,/-~ · "clear and 
'\ 
identifiable" discharge standards. Sees. Rep. 92-414, at 




The Vermont Court considered these difficulties, but 
nonetheless found that the imposition of Vermont law was 
consistent with the Act. The ,9'ourt reasoned that because 
the state-law:-and the FWPCA have the same ultimate goal, 
1 . . . 11 t · · · ~ .5/tzJ e 1m1nat1ng po u 10n, preemption 1s unnecessary. ---r.1c 
>t!: /f7t also concluded that its decision did not conflict 
with the permit system, since respondents' claim is 
~ 14 "The citizen suit prov1s1on [§505] is consistent with 
principles underlying the • • • Act, that is~the development of 
clear and identifiable requirements. Such requirements should 
provide manageable and precise benchmarks for performance." 2 
Legis. History 1499. 
J .£a.x_' f 
u.,,,J;f_~_, 
/l..l-~ ~ 
~ _. ~ ~r 
~I\~ 
a.~1~.f 




fa~ ~ ~~ i:,-.,, ~ L-f-l-
~,., 9 ~1-r~f-• ~~ ~ 1] 
~ ~ . 
designed simply io redress a particular injury rather than 
to impose a standard. 602 F. Supp., 
at 271-272. J_,~ 
~, 
no doubt that the~f the FWPCA 
~ J,,,.-iJ- _P .. i~J~,v-·eliminat pollution, 33 u.s.c. §1251(a)t lt does not 
is to ~ 
/ 
"' o.Y ~ 
'rfv" LY"".~r. /.l.~~-;~ 
~
fv ~ f 11 however that all laws that &hare this goal 
0 , , I\ - ... 14• 
1 ~ r. . . ~~ ,_j.,. . . necessarily are compatible.T~ state law also is preempted 
tY° fll/'-tr ~ ---
9 r /)/ r~ r7 /r { if it interfe --------
'Yl"1 yV'v--' 
✓~ ft._,__ ·A-,, ~/4r<4--L..~ 
~;{ '4 & Freezers As ~-__e,,,_, f-/44.,,,~ -n../ // 
3
/ ·_ 
bring about t : ~ .. Jk~~~ 
HP~'. 467 U.S. 461, ?~ ¼ ,.,~ ~ 
.!1Y~ -6-(., ">"<-~ ~ __,___ ~ ,,-v---
V::1J<# 1 ,_/' onflict betw d...,.."/ ;-~ /1.,r-,,. ,_,.  .....,,__ 
{)/'~~ )~~~ 
~ v ffected Stat • " 
~ ~~npersuaded by the lower Court's conclusion that the 
~ · =~= · do have a "regulatory" impact on th K ~nee rem 1es 
~ v;::, ~r' ~i.r ~.~J"" .. ~ ,~~ 
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~~~~~~vY'"'"~ 
Regardless of the reason for zubjectin -----IPC~ ~ 
• ~A.~ 
p-i,_f~.fw..-
Vermont common law, the ?r~bre ef~ of either damage~ (~~ 
L_ __ - ~ ~+-r r 
or an injunction is that the_,.,eompany would mo;:;y i::.t;s 
~ ~~ ~1--~"u-j. ~
~d-ischar-ge-,--leveL~id- f+itnre J iahllity. See Perez v. 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~+ 
Campbell, 4)}~S. 637, 651-652 (1971) (effect, rather 
urpose, of state stat~e ~vvc:1.us2---t-' 10n 
analysis)~ Because the authority to regulate a source's 
~~~ ~ 
~ was granted by Congress exclusively to the federal 
~ 
government and the source State, the Act preempts a 
~ ~~ 
a New York source. 
~~ w~ ~ .i,v.) 
~~ 
IV 
J . µ-4~ 
~ 
Our decision that Vermont law is inapplicable does 
y~ not leave the respondents in this case without a remedy. -
Ulii!D~~,;A-Lj~ 
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clause specifically preserves other state actions. 
Nothing in the Act, for example, bars respondents from 
c.--V~f 
bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to New York law. By 
"' a... ~ ~ ~ ~ 
its terms the FWPCA allows Statez to impose tonqher 
/\. / A. 
on in-state sources, and in Milwaukee II we 
recognized that this authority may include the right to 
33. 
impose ~r common-law as well as higher statutory 
restrictions. 451 U.S., at 328 (suggesting that "States 
may adopt more stringent limitations ••. through state 
nuisance laws, and apply them to in-state dischargers."); 
see also Committee for Jones Falls Sewerage System v. 
Train, 539 F. 2d 1006, 1009 and n. 9 (CA4 1976) (FWPCA 
preserves common law suits filed in source state). The 
application of New York common law to IPC does not fall 
within the Act's preemptive scope, because it neither 
.. 
£,µ_ ~ ~ 
subjects the source toJan inaeterminatQ...FH:HOOer of 
~~~~/ 
Ar~±at~ lmdies, nor otherwise intrudes on the 
~ ~ ~..-11- . 
federal/source-state partnership. Affected parties 
,.-0 
34. 
therefore remain free to seek redress for the harm caused 
~ 
by interstate pollution, proviae·d ~t. thiay~p~y the law 
~~~~ 
of the source Stat~.·J 
The Vermont Court concluded that this distinction 
~ 
~)µ~ 
between source-state and affected-state law is contrary /to 
,d._ a..+ 41fl1tt-<.,;.f ~~ 
the language of the saving clauA wtr-N;,w preserv~state 
2 
~ suits without qualification. 602 F. Supp., at 269. We 
~ 
}1._a...,/AMa"t-~ 
15 Nothing in our decision, e, affects respondents' 
right to pursue the remedies c-urre~y ·provided by the Act. If, 
as alleged, IPC also is violating the terms of it~~t, 
respondents may bring a citizen suit provision to 
compliance. §505, 33 u.s.c. §1365. Respondents 1H this ca-se 
also had the opportunity to protect their interest before the 
fact by commenting and objecting to the the proposed permit 
standard. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S., at 326 (Act provides 




hink, however, that this interpretation reaas more int' 
the clause than Congress intenaea. The lower Court's 









the possibility of subjecting sources to affectea-stat 
law, aespite the inconsistency with the rest of the Act. 
See Silkwooa, 464 U.S., at 256. But as we saia in 
"The fact that the language of [the saving 
clause} is repeatea in haec verba in the 
citizen-suit provisions of a vast array of 
environmental legislat i on_ ... inaicates that it 
aoes not reflect any considerea juagment about 
what remeaies were previously available or 
continue to be available unaer any particular 
statute." 451 U.S., at 329 n. 22. 
bthing in the legislative history 




r further its intent by construing the saving clause in , 
-... / ? 
{ way that_conflicts with tbe Act as a whole. 16 
1-o 
I IPC asks us hold that all 
,\ 
state-law suits also must be brought in New York courts. 
~ 
./\~he company cites little authority and no compelling 
~ ~~~~ 
justification for H-S position, andnentJy .we-see n°<:7 
~ ~that Vermont is an improper forum. 17 IPC 6 
apparently believes that because a cause of action is 
16 See Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 
426, 446 (1907) (savings clause cannot be construed in a way that 
is inconsistent with remainder of statute; "In other words, the 
Act cannot be held to destroi itself"); see generally F. 
Mccaffrey, Statutory Construction §62 (1953) {general savings 
provision does not apply when it is contrary to remainder of 
statute). 
17 IPC suggests that judges and juries may not have the proper 
"perspective" to evaluate a claim filed by its own citizens 
against an out-of-state source. Cert. Petn. at 6 and n. *. We 
reject this contention. One of the original reasons for allowing 
federal courts to hear diversity claims was to protect against 
this type of local bias. See Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 
U.S. 100, 111 {1898); '~ J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal 
Constitution 533 (1854) {remarks of James Madison). A source 



















preempted, judicial jurisdiction over the claim is 
affected as well. But the Act preempts laws, not courts. 
In the absence of statutory authority to the contrary,18 
w. 
Ii.£.,..~ Ila. /./-tJ_ 
e-----te--d--e-r:rcn=~'-N::.ol'R----'irni~i.no-1-'r~a-f>-+rh:,t~ that a 
district court sitting in diversity is competent to apply 
the law of a foreign State. 
V 
The District Court correctly denied !PC's motion for 
summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. Nothing 
in the Act prevents a district court sitting in an 
affected State from hearing a common-law nuisance suit, 
provided that jurisdiction otherwise is proper. The Court 
18 Cf. §505 (c) (1), 33 u.s.c. §1365 (c) (1) (citizen suit to 















below erred, however, in concluding that it could apply 
£A,..-, 
Vermont law to, this litigation. The FWPCA plainly shows 
'\ 
~~ 
that claims based on affected-state lawAinterf.ere with the 
~/. 's ~~ ~r-'d ~~- a-t--
CGJ:lgres.s.i..an.el ..system for reguJ at-ing water pollution, and 
Jsi;:,e~ 
accordingly are preempted. 
Th S -----=i_ a.:_~t d .. 
4 .~ff~J./~d ' e ~-·:t'•n.;-l.O, ec1s1onl\ 1s a 1rme 1n part 
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
and 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves the preemptive scope of the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (CWA or Act). 1 The 
question presented is whether the Act preempts a common-
law nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Vermont 
law, when the source of the alleged injury is located in New 
York. 
I 
Lake Champlain forms part of the border between the 
states of New York and Vermont. Petitioner International 
Paper Company (IPC) operates a pulp and paper mill on the 
New York side of the lake. In the course of its business, 
IPC discharges a variety of effluents into the lake through a 
diffusion pipe. The pipe runs from the mill through the 
water toward Vermont, ending a short distance before the 
state boundary line that divides the lake. 
Respondents are a group of property owners who reside or 
lease land on the Vermont shore. In 1978 the owners filed a 
class action suit against IPC, claiming, inter alia, that the 
discharge of effluents constituted a "continuing nuisance" 
under Vermont common law. Respondents alleged that the 
1 The statute was originally named the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act. Congress changed the name of the statute in 1977. 33 U. S. C. 
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pollutants made the water "foul, unhealthy, smelly, and ... 
unfit for recreational use," thereby diminishing the value of 
their property. App. 29. The owners asked for $20 million 
in compensatory damages, $100 million in punitive damages, 
and injunctive relief that would require IPC to restructure 
part of its water treatment system. 2 The action was filed in 
State Superior Court, and then later removed to Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Vermont. 
IPC moved for summary judgment and judgment on the 
pleadings, claiming that the Clean Water Act preempted re-
spondents' state law suit. With the parties' consent, the 
District Judge deferred a ruling on the motion pending the 
decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a similar 
case involving Illinois and the city of Milwaukee. In that 
dispute, Illinois filed a nuisance action against the city under 
Illinois statutory and common law, seeking to abate the al-
leged pollution of Lake Michigan. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
731 F. 2d 403 (CA7 1984) (Milwaukee III), cert. denied sub 
nom., Scott v. City of Hammond, 469 U. S. 1196 (1985). 3 
The Court of Appeals ultimately remanded the case for dis-
missal of Illinois' claim, finding that the CW A precluded the 
application of one State's law against a pollution source lo-
cated in a different State. The decision was based in part on 
the Court's conclusion that the application of different state 
laws to a single "point source" 4 would interfere with the 
carefully devised regulatory system established by the CW A. 
Id., at 414. The Court also concluded that the only suits that 
2 The complaint also sought monetary and injunctive relief for air pollu-
tion allegedly caused by the IPC mill. App. 35-36. This claim is not be-
fore the Court. 
3 The decisions in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972) 
(Milwaukee I), and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981) 
(Milwaukee II), are discussed in Part II, infra. 
• A "point source" is defined by the CW A as "any discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged." 33 U. S. C. § 1362(14); see 40 CFR § 122.2 (1986). It is not dis-
puted that IPC is a point source within the meaning of the Act. 
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were not preempted were those alleging violations of the 
laws of the polluting, or "source," State. Id., at 413-414. 
IPC argued that the holding in Milwaukee III was dispos-
itive in this case. The Vermont District Court disagreed 
and denied the motion to dismiss. Ouellette v. International 
Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (1985). The Court acknowl-
edged that federal law normally governs interstate water pol-
lution. It found, however, that two sections of the CWA ex-
plicitly preserve state-law rights of action. First, § 510 of 
the Act provides: 
"Except as expressly provided ... , nothing in this chap-
ter shall . . . be construed as impairing or in any manner 
affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with re-
spect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such 
States." 33 U. S. C. § 1370. 
In addition, § 505(e) states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which 
any person (or class of persons) may have under any 
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other 
relief .... " 33 U. S. C. § 1365(e). 
The District Court held that these two prov1s10ns (to-
gether, "the saving clause") made it clear that federal law did 
not preempt entirely the rights of States to control pollution. 
Therefore the question presented, said the court, was which 
types of state suits Congress intended to preserve. It con-
sidered three possibilities: 5 first, the saving clause could be 
construed to preserve state law only as it applied to waters 
not covered by the CW A. But since the Act applies to virtu-
5 For a discussion of each of the three interpretations of the saving 
clause, see Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal 
Common Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wisc. L. Rev. 627, 664-671. 
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ally all surface water in the country, 6 the District Court 
rejected this possibility. Second, the saving clause might 
preserve state nuisance law only as it applies to discharges 
occurring within the source State; under this view a claim 
could be filed against IPC under New York common law, but 
not under Vermont law. This was the position adopted by 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee 
III. The Vermont Court nevertheless rejected this option, 
finding that "there is simply nothing in the Act which sug-
gests that Congress intended to impose such limitations on 
the use of state law." Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 
supra, at 269. · 
The District Court therefore adopted the third interpreta-
tion of the saving clause, and held that a state action to re-
dress interstate water pollution could be maintained under 
the law of the State in which the injury occurred. 602 F. 
Supp., at 269. The Court was unpersuaded by the concern 
expressed in Milwaukee III that the application of out-of-
state law to a point source would conflict with the CWA. It 
said there was no interference with the procedures estab-
lished by Congress because a State's "imposition of compen-
satory damage awards and other equitable relief for injuries 
caused . . . merely supplement the standards and limitations 
imposed by the Act." Id., at 271 (emphasis in original). 
The Court also found that the use of state law did not conflict 
with the ultimate goal of the CW A, since in each case the ob-
jective was to decrease the level of pollution. Ibid. 
6 While the Act purports to regulate only "navigable waters," this term 
has been viewed as covering all surface bodies of water, even if they are 
not navigable in the traditional sense. See 33 U. S. C. § 1362(7) (defining 
navigable waters as "waters of the United States"); House Consideration 
of H. Res. 1146 (Oct. 4, 1972), 1 Legislative History of Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 250 (Committee Print compiled for 
the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. 
No. 93-1, p. 250 (1973) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.); ·see also United States v. 
Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F. 2d 1317, 1324-1325 (CA61974) (requir-
ing permit for non-navigable tributary). ·· 
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The District Court certified its decision for interlocutory 
appeal, see 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed for the reasons stated by the 
District Court. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 776 F. 
2d 55, 56 (CA2 1985) (per curiam). We granted certiorari to 
resolve the Circuit conflict on this important issue of federal 
preemption. -- U.S. -- (1986). We now affirm the 
denial of IPC's motion to dismiss , but reverse the decision 
below to the extent it permits the application of Vermont law 
to this litigation. We hold that when a court considers a 
state-law claim concerning interstate water pollution that is 
subject to the CW A, the court must apply the law of the 
State in which the point source is located. 
II 
A brief review of the regulatory framework is necessary to 
set the stage for this case. Until fairly recently, federal 
common law governed the use and misuse of interstate 
water. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 
92, 110 (1938) (water apportionment); Missouri v. Illinois, 
200 U. S. 496 (1906) (water pollution). 7 This principle was 
called into question in 1971, when the Court suggested in 
dicta that an interstate dispute between a state and a private 
company should be resolved by reference to state nuisance 
law. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 
498, n. 3 (1971) ("[A]n action such as this, if otherwise cogni-
zable in federal district court, would have to be adjudicated 
under state law.") (citing Erie R . Co. v. Tompkins , 309 U. S. 
64 (1938)). 
We had occasion to address this issue in the first of two 
Supreme Court cases involving the dispute between Illinois 
7 Accord, North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 (1923); cf. Georgia 
v. Tennessee CO'[YfJer Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907) (air pollution); see also Mil-
waukee I , 406 U. S. , at 104-107; Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Pri-
vate Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 152-155 (1985); 
Note, 1982 Wisc. L. ·Rev. , supra n. 5, at 630-636. 
85-1233-OPINION 
6 INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. v. OUELLETTE 
and Milwaukee. In Milwaukee I, the State moved for leave 
to file an original action in this Court, seeking to enjoin the 
city from discharging sewage into Lake Michigan. Illinois 
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972). The Court's opin-
ion in that case affirmed the view that the regulation of inter-
state water pollution is a matter of federal, not state, law, 
thus overruling the contrary suggestion in Wyandotte. 8 Id., 
at 102, n. 3. The Court was concerned, however, that the 
existing version of the Act was not sufficiently comprehen-
sive to resolve all interstate disputes that were likely to 
arise. Milwaukee I therefore held that these cases should 
be resolved by reference to federal common law; the implicit 
corollary of this ruling was that state common law was pre-
empted. See id., at 107, n. 9; Milwaukee III, 731 F. 2d, at 
407. The Court noted, though, that future action by Con-
gress to regulate water pollution might preempt federal com-
mon law as well. 406 U. S., at 107. 
Congress thereafter adopted comprehensive amendments 
to the Act. We considered the impact of the new legislation 
when Illinois and Milwaukee returned to the Court several 
years later. 9 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 
(1981) (Milwaukee II). There the Court noted that the 
amendments were a "'complete rewriting'" of the statute 
considered in Milwaukee I, and that they were "'the most 
comprehensive and far reaching'" provisions that Congress 
8 Although the Court's opinion could be read as distinguishing rather 
than overruling that part of Wyandotte , a later decision made it clear that 
state common law actions did not survive Milwaukee I . See Milwaukee 
II, 451 U. S., at 327, n. 19 (1981); see also Glicksman, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. , 
supra n. 7, at 156, n. 176. 
9 In Milwaukee I the Court denied a motion to file an original action but 
ruled that Illinois could maintain an action in federal district court. The 
State then filed suit in Illinois District Court, alleging that the city was lia-
ble for creating a public nuisance under both federal and Illinois common 
law. The complaint also alleged a violation of the State Environmental 
Protection Act. See Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 310, and n. 4.; Milwau-
kee III, 751 F. 2d,. at 404. 
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ever had passed in this area. Id., at 317-318 (citations to 
legislative history omitted). Consequently, the Court held 
that federal legislation now occupied the field, preempting all 
federal common law. The Court left open the question of 
whether injured parties still had a cause of action under state 
law. Id., at 310, n. 4. The case was remanded for further 
consideration; the result on remand was the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee III, 
discussed supra. 
One of the primary features of the 1972 amendments is the 
establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES), a federal permit program designed to 
regulate the discharge of polluting effluents. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1342; see generally EPA v. State Water Resources Control 
Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205-208 (1976) (describing NPDES 
system). Section 301 of the Act generally prohibits the dis-
charge of any effluent into a navigable body of water unless 
the point source has obtained an NPDES permit from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The permits es-
tablish detailed discharge standards for the various effluents 
a source produces, and a compliance schedule pursuant to 
which the source must meet these standards. 
The amendments also recognize that the States should 
have a significant role in protecting their own natural re-
sources. 33 U. S. C. § 1251(b). Therefore, if a source State 
such as New York wants to impose more stringent discharge 
levels, the Act authorizes that State to adopt its own permit 
standards. § 1342(b). The state standards are subject to 
EPA approval, but once this approval is obtained the State 
becomes the primary regulating authority, and the federal 
permit requirements are superseded. § 1342(c). Thus 
while the CW A establishes a regulatory "partnership" be-
tween the Federal Government and the source State, under 
the Act a point source is only required to meet a single set of 
discharge standards. 
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While source States have a strong voice in regulating their 
own pollution, the CW A contemplates a much lesser role for 
States that share an interstate waterway with the source 
(the affected States). Even though it may be harmed by the 
discharges, an affected State only has an advisory role in 
regulating pollution that originates beyond its borders. Be-
fore a federal permit may be issued, each affected State is 
given notice and the opportunity to object to the proposed 
standards at a public interest hearing. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1341(a)(2); Milwaukee III , 731 F . 2d, at 412. An affected 
State has similar rights to be consulted before the source 
State issues its own permit; the source State must send noti-
fication, and must consider the objections and recommenda-
tions submitted by other States before taking action. 10 
§ 1342(b). Significantly, however, an affected State does not 
have the authority to block the issuance of the permit if it is 
dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An affected 
State's only recourse is to apply to the EPA Administrator, 
who then has the discretion to disapprove the permit if he 
concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on 
interstate waters. § 1342(d)(2). Also, an affected State 
may not establish a separate permit system to regulate an 
out-of-state source. See § 1342(b) (State may establish per-
mit system for waters "within its jurisdiction" (emphasis 
added), Lake Erie Alliance for Protection of the Coastal Cor-
ridor v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 
1074-1075 (WD Pa.), aff'd, 707 F. 2d 1392 (CA3 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U. S. 915 (1983); State v. Champion Interna-
tional Corp ., 709 S. W. 2d 569 (Tenn. 1986), cert. pending, 
1° For a more detailed description of the permit system, see R. Zener, 
Guide to Federal E nvironmental Law 61-88 (1981). 
Although the record in this case is unclear, it appears that during the 
time relevant to this case IPC was operating under a federal NPDES per-
mit. App. 29-30. A draft of the permit was submitted to Vermont as an 
affected State, and Vermont as well as other interested parties objected to 
the proposed discharge standards. Id. , at 65-66. The EPA held a hear-
ing that IPC and at least some of the respondents apparently attended. 
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No. 86-57. Thus the Act makes it clear that affected States 
occupy a subordinate position to source States in the federal 
regulatory program. 
III 
With this regulatory framework in mind, we turn to the 
question presented: whether the Act preempts Vermont 
common law to the extent that law may impose liability on a 
New York point source. We begin the analysis by noting 
that it is not necessary for a federal statute to provide explic-
itly that particular state laws are preempted. Hillsborough 
County , Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 
U. S. 707, -- (1985). Although courts should not lightly 
infer preemption, 11 it may be presumed when the federal 
legislation is "sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary 
regulation." Ibid. (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)). In addition to express or implied 
preemption, a state law also is invalid to the extent that it 
"actually conflicts with a ... federal statute." Ray v. 
Atlantic Rich.field Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978). Such a 
conflict will be found when the state law "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress." Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Medical Laboratories, supra, at -- (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
A 
As we noted in Milwaukee II, Congress intended the 1972 
Act amendments to "establish an all-encompassing program 
of water pollution regulation." 451 U. S., at 318. We ob-
served that congressional "views on the comprehensive na-
11 See Rice v. Sante Fe Electric Co., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[W]e 
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and man-
ifest purpose of Congress."); Milwaukee II , 451 U. S., at 312; see also 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 255 (1984). 
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ture of the legislation were practically universal." Id., at 
318, n. 13 (citing to legislative history). An examination of 
the amendments amply supports these views. The Act ap-
plies to all point sources and virtually all bodies of water, and 
it sets forth the procedures for obtaining a permit in great 
detail. The CW A also provides its own remedies, including 
civil and criminal fines for permit violations, and "citizen 
suits" that allow individuals (including those from affected 
States) to compel the EPA to enforce a permit. 12 In light of 
this pervasive regulation and the fact that the control of in-
terstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law, Mil-
waukee I, 406 U. S. , at 107, it is clear that the only state 
suits that remain available are those specifically preserved by 
the Act. 
Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollu-
tion regulation, the saving clause negates the inference that 
Congress "left no room" for state causes of action. Respond-
ents read the language of the saving clause broadly to pre-
serve both a State's right to regulate its waters, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1370, and an injured party's right to seek relief under "any 
statute or common law," § 1365(e) (emphasis added). They 
claim that this language and selected portions of the legisla-
tive history compel the inference that Congress intended to 
preserve the right to bring suit under the law of any affected-
state. 13 We cannot accept this reading of the Act. 
12 See 33 U. S. C. § 1319(a), § 1365(a), (h); see generally, Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U. S. 
1, 13-14 (1980) (discussing "elaborate" remedial provisions). 
13 A Senate Report accompanying the amendments states: "[I]f damages 
could be shown, other remedies [in addition to a citizen suit] would remain 
available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a 
defense to a common law action for pollution damages." 2 Leg. Hist. 1499. 
Respondents also note that after reviewing the legislative history, the Dis-
trict Court found no evidence that Congress intended to alter the tradi-
tional tort law principle that a party may bring suit in the State where the 
injury occurred. See Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 258-259 (1933). 
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As with any statutory interpretation question, the Court 
must be guided by the goals and policies of the entire Act, 
rather than by selected sentences or provisions. Philbrook 
v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 713 (1975). This is especially true 
with respect to a federal enactment as comprehensive as the 
CW A. After examining the CW A as a whole, its purposes 
and its history, we are convinced that if affected States were 
allowed to impose separate discharge standards on a single 
point source, the inevitable result would be a serious inter-
ference with the achievement of the "full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." See Hillsborough County v. Automated 
Medical Laboratories, supra, at--. Because we do not 
believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn 
statute through a general saving clause, 14 we conclude that 
the CW A precludes a court from applying the law of an af-
fected State against an out-of-state source. 
B 
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law "stands as 
an obstacle" to the full implementation of the CW A, it is not 
enough to say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state 
law is to eliminate water pollution. A state law also is pre-
empted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal 
statute was designed to reach this goal. See Michigan Can-
ners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mkt. & Bargaining 
Bd., 467 U. S. 461, 477 (1984). In this case the application of 
Vermont law against IPC would allow respondents to circum-
vent the NPDES permit system, thereby upsetting the bal-
ance of public and private interests so carefully addressed by 
the Act. 
14 We noted in Milwaukee II: 
"The fact that the language of [the saving clause] is repeated in haec verba 
in the citizen-suit provisions of a vast array of environmental legislation 
... indicates that it does not reflect any considered judgment about what 
other remedies were previously available or continue to be available under 
any particular statute." 451 U. S., at 329, n. 22. 
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By establishing a permit system for effluent discharges, 
Congress implicitly has recognized that the goal of the 
CW A-elimination of water pollution-cannot be achieved 
immediately, and that it cannot be realized without incurring 
costs. The EPA Administrator issues permits according to 
established effluent limitations and water quality limitations, 
that in turn are based upon available technology, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1314, and competing public and industrial uses, § 1312(a). 
The Administrator must consider the impact of the dis-
charges on the waterway, the types of effluents, and the 
schedule for compliance, each of which may vary widely 
among sources. If a State elects to impose its own stand-
ards, it also must consider the technological feasibility of 
more stringent controls. Given the nature of these complex 
decisions, it is not surprising that the Act limits the right to 
administer the permit system to the EPA and the source 
States. See § 1342(b). 
An interpretation of the saving clause that preserved ac-
tions brought under an affected State's law would disrupt 
this balance of interests. If a New York source were liable 
for violations of Vermont law, that law could effectively over-
ride both the permit requirements and the policy choices 
made by the source State. The affected State's nuisance 
laws would subject the point source to the threat of legal and 
equitable penalties if the permit standards were less strin-
gent than those imposed by the affected state. Such penal-
ties would compel the source to adopt different control stand-
ards and a different compliance schedule from those approved 
by the EPA, even though the affected State had not engaged 
in the same weighing of the costs and benefits. This case il-
lustrates the problems with such a rule. If the Vermont 
Court ruled that respondents were entitled to the full amount 
of damages and injunctive relief sought in the complaint, at a 
minimum IPC would have to change its methods of doing 
business and controlling pollution to avoid the threat of ongo-
ing liability. In suits such as this, an affected-state court 
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also could require the source to cease operations by ordering 
immediate abatement. Critically, these liabilities would at-
tach even though the source had complied fully with its state 
and federal permit obligations. The inevitable result of such 
suits would be that Vermont and other states could do indi-
rectly what they could not do directly-regulate the conduct 
of out-of-state sources. 15 
Application of an affected State's law to an out-of-state 
source also would undermine the important goals of efficiency 
and predictability in the permit system. The history of the 
1972 amendments shows that Congress intended to establish 
"clear and identifiable" discharge standards. See S. Rep. 
92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Legislative History of Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 250 (Committee Print 
compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the 
Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 250 (1973). 16 As 
noted above, under the reading of the saving clause proposed 
by respondents, a source would be subject to a variety of 
common-law rules established by the different States along 
the interstate waterways. These nuisance standards of ten 
are "vague" and "indeterminate." 11 The application of 
1
• The interpretation of the Act adopted by the Courts below also would 
have the result of allowing affected States effectively to set discharge 
standards without consulting with the source State, even though source 
States are required by the Act to give affected States an opportunity to be 
heard and a chance to comment before issuing a permit. 
16 "The citizen suit provision [§ 505] is consistent with principles under-
lying the ... Act, [which are] the development of clear and identifiable re-
quirements. Such requirements should provide manageable and precise 
benchmarks for performance." 2 Leg. Hist. 1499. 
17 See Milwaukee II , 451 U. S., at 317; see also W. Prosser, Law of 
Torts 571 (4th ed. 1971) ("There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in 
the entire law than that which surrounds the word "nuisance."). The pos-
sibility that a source will have to meet a number of different standards is 
relatively small in this case, since Vermont is the only State that shares 
Lake Champlain with New York. But consider, for example, a plant that 
discharges effluents into the Mississippi River. A source located in Min-
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numerous States' laws would only exacerbate the vagueness 
and resulting uncertainty. The Court of Appeals in Milwau-
kee III identified the problem with such an irrational system 
of regulation: 
"For a number of different states to have independent 
and plenary regulatory authority over a single discharge 
would lead to chaotic confrontation between sovereign 
states. Dischargers would be forced to meet not only 
the statutory limitations of all states potentially affected 
by their discharges but also the common law standards 
developed through case law of those states. It would be 
virtually impossible to predict the standard for a lawful 
discharge into an interstate body of water. Any permit 
issued under the Act would be rendered meaningless." 
731 F. 2d, at 414. 
It is unlikely-to say the least-that Congress intended to 
establish such a chaotic regulatory structure. 
Nothing in the Act gives each affected State this power to 
regulate discharges. The CW A carefully defines the role of 
both the source and affected States, and specifically provides 
for a process whereby their interests will be considered and 
balanced by the source State and the EPA. This delineation 
of authority represents Congress' considered judgment as to 
the best method of serving the public interest and reconciling 
the often competing concerns of those affected by the pollu-
tion. It would be extraordinary for Congress, after devising 
an elaborate permit system that sets clear standards, to tol-
erate common-law suits that have the potential to undermine 
this regulatory structure. 
C 
Our conclusion that Vermont nuisance law is inapplicable 
to a New York point source does not leave respondents with-
out a remedy. The CW A precludes only those suits that 
nesota theoretically could be subject to the nuisance laws of any of the nine 
downstream States. 
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may require standards of effluent control that are incompati-
ble with those established by the procedures set forth in the 
Act. The saving clause specifically preserves other state ac-
tions, and therefore nothing in the Act bars aggrieved indi-
viduals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of 
the source State. By its terms the CW A allows States such 
as New York to impose higher standards on its own point 
sources, and in Milwaukee II we recognized that this author-
ity may include the right to impose higher common-law as 
well as higher statutory restrictions. 451 U. S., at 328 (sug-
gesting that "States may adopt more stringent limitations 
... through state nuisance law, and apply them to in-state 
dischargers"); see also Committee for Jones Falls Sewerage 
System v. Train, 539 F. 2d 1006, 1009, and n. 9 (CA4 1976) 
(CW A preserves common law suits filed in source State). 18 
An action brought against IPC under New York nuisance 
law would not frustrate the goals of the CW A as would a suit 
governed by Vermont law. 19 First, application of the source 
18 Nothing in our decision, of course, affects respondents' right to pursue 
remedies that may be provided by the Act. If, as was also alleged in re-
spondents' complaint, IPC is violating the terms of its permit, respondents 
may bring a citizen suit to compel compliance. 33 U. S. C. § 1365. Re-
spondents also had the opportunity to protect their interests before the 
fact by commenting and objecting to the proposed standard. See Milwau-
kee II, 451 U. S., at 326 (Act provides "ample" opportunity for affected 
States to protect their rights). 
19 The District Court concluded that the interference with the Act is in-
significant, in part because respondents are seeking to be compensated for 
a specific harm rather than trying to "regulate" IPC. Ouellette v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 271-272 (Vt. 1985). The Soliciter 
General, on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, adopts only a 
portion of this view. He acknowledges that suits seeking punitive or in-
junctive relief under affected-state law should be preempted because of the 
interference they cause with the CW A. The Government asserts that 
compensatory damages, however, may be brought under the law of the 
State where the injury occurred. The SG reasons that compensatory 
damages only require the source to pay for the external costs created by 
the pollution, and thus do not "regulate" in a way inconsistent with the 
Act. The Government cites Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 
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State's law does not disturb the balance among federal, 
source-state, and affected-state interests. Because the Act 
specifically allows source States to impose stricter standards, 
the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt the regu-
latory partnership established by the permit system. Sec-
ond, the restriction of suits to those brought under source-
state nuisance law prevents a source from being subject to an 
indeterminate number of potential regulations. Although 
New York nuisance law may impose separate standards and 
thus create some tension with the permit system, a source 
only is required to look to a single additional authority, whose 
rules should be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can 
be expected to take into account their own nuisance laws in 
setting permit requirements. 
IPC asks the Court to go one step further and hold that all 
state-law suits also must be brought in source-state courts. 
As petitioner cites little authority or justification for this 
position, we find no basis for holding that Vermont is an 
improper forum. Simply because a cause of action is pre-
empted does not mean that judicial jurisdiction over the claim 
(1984), for the proposition that in certain circumstances a court may find 
preemption of some remedies and not others. 
We decline the Government's invitation to draw a line between the types 
of relief sought. There is no suggestion of such a distinction in either the 
Act or the legislative history. As the Court noted in Silkwood, unless 
there is evidence that Congress meant to "split" a particular remedy for 
preemption purposes, it is assumed that the full cause of action under state 
law is available (or as in this case, preempted). Id., at 255. We also think 
it would be unwise to treat compensatory damages differently under the 
facts of this case. If the Vermont Court determined that respondents 
were entitled to the relief requested, the result would be that IPC would 
be compelled to adopt different or additional means of pollution control 
from those required by the Act, regardless of whether the purpose of the 
relief was compensatory or regulatory. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 
637, 651-652 (1971) (effect rather than purpose of a state statute governs 
preemption analysis). As discussed supra, this result would be irreconcil-
able with the CW A's exclusive grant of authority to the Federal Govern-
ment and the source State. 
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is affected as well; the Act preempts laws, not courts. In the 
absence of statutory authority to the contrary, 20 the rule is 
settled that a district court sitting in diversity is competent 
to apply the law of a foreign State. 
IV 
The District Court correctly denied IPC's motion for sum-
mary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. Nothing in 
the Act prevents a court sitting in an affected State from 
hearing a common-law nuisance suit, provided that jurisdic-
tion otherwise is proper. Both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals erred, however, in concluding that Ver-
mont law governs this litigation. The application of affected-
state laws would be incompatible with the Act's delegation of 
authority and its comprehensive regulation of water pollu-
tion. The Act preempts state law to the extent that the 
state law is applied to an out-of-state point source. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
20 Cf. 33 U. S. C. § 1365(c)(l) (citizen suit to enforce permit must be 
brought in judicial district where source is located). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1233 
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., PETITIONER v. 
HARMEL OUELLETTE ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED ST ATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves the pre-emptive scope of the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S. C. § 1251 et seq. (CWA or Act). 1 The 
question presented is whether the Act preempts a common-
law nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Vermont 
law, when the source of the alleged injury is located in New 
York. 
I 
Lake Champlain forms part of the border between the 
states of New York and Vermont. Petitioner International 
Paper Company (IPC) operates a pulp and paper mill on the 
New York side of the lake. In the course of its business, 
IPC discharges a variety of effluents into the lake through a 
diffusion pipe. The pipe runs from the mill through the 
water toward Vermont, ending a short distance before the 
state boundary line that divides the lake. 
Respondents are a group of property owners who reside or 
lease land on the Vermont shore. In 1978 the owners filed a 
class action suit against IPC, claiming, inter alia, that the 
discharge of effluents constituted a "continuing nuisance" 
under Vermont common law. Respondents alleged that the 
pollutants made the water "foul, unhealthy, smelly, and ... 
1 The statute also is known as the Federal Water Pollution Control AcQ 
See note following 33 U. S. C. § 1251. 
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unfit for recreational use," thereby diminishing the value of 
their property. App. 29. The owners asked for $20 million 
in compensatory damages, $100 million in punitive damages, 
and injunctive relief that would require IPC to restructure 
part of its water treatment system. 2 The action was filed in 
State Superior Court, and then later removed to Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Vermont. 
IPC moved for summary judgment and judgment on the 
pleadings, claiming that the Clean Water Act pre-empted re-
spondents' state law suit. With the parties' consent, the 
District Judge deferred a ruling on the motion pending the 
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in a 
similar case involving Illinois and the city of Milwaukee. In 
that dispute, Illinois filed a nuisance action against the city 
under Illinois statutory and common law, seeking to abate 
the alleged pollution of Lake Michigan. Illinois v. Milwau-
kee, 731 F. 2d 403 (1984) (Milwaukee Ill), cert. denied, 469 
U. S. 1196 (1985). 3 The Court of Appeals ultimately re-
manded the case for dismissal of Illinois' claim, finding that 
the CW A precluded the application of one State's law against 
a pollution source located in a different State. The decision 
was based in part on the Court's conclusion that the applica-
tion of different state laws to a single "point source" 4 would 
interfere with the carefully devised regulatory system estab-
lished by the CW A. 731 F. 2d, at 414. The Court also con-
cluded that the only suits that were not preempted were 
2 The complaint also sought monetary and injunctive relief for air pollu-
tion allegedly caused by the IPC mill. App. 35-36. This claim is not be-
fore the Court. 
3 The decisions in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972) (Milwau-
kee I), and Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II), are 
discussed in Part II, infra. 
• A ''point source" is defined by the CWA as "any discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged." 33 U. S. C. § 1362(14); see 40 CFR § 122.2 (1986). It is not dis-
puted that IPC is a point source within the meaning of the Act. 
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those alleging violations of the laws of the polluting, or 
"source," State. Id., at 413-414. 
IPC argued that the holding in Milwaukee II I was dispos-
itive in this case. The Vermont District Court disagreed 
and denied the motion to dismiss. 602 F. Supp. 264 (1985). 
The Court acknowledged that federal law normally governs 
interstate water pollution. It found, however, that two sec-
tions of the CW A explicitly preserve state-law rights of ac-
tion. First, § 510 of the Act provides: 
"Except as expressly provided ... , nothing in this chap-
ter shall . . . be construed as impairing or in any manner 
affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with re-
spect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such 
States." 33 U. S. C. § 1370. 
In addition, § 505(e) states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which 
any person (or class of persons) may have under any 
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other 
relief .... " 33 U. S. C. § 1365(e). 
The District Court held that these two provisions (to-
gether, "the saving clause") made it clear that federal law did 
not pre-empt entirely the rights of States to control pollution. 
Therefore the question presented, said the court, was which 
types of state suits Congress intended to preserve. It con-
sidered three possibilities: 5 first, the saving clause could be 
construed to preserve state law only as it applied to waters 
not covered by the CW A. But since the Act applies to virtu-
ally all surface water in the country, 6 the District Court 
& For a discussion of each of the three interpretations of the saving 
clause, see Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal 
Common Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 627, 664-671. 
6 While the Act purports to regulate only "navigable waters," this term] 
has been construed expansively to cover waters that are not navigable in 
the traditional sense. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
-- U. S. -- (1985); 33 U. S. C. § 1362(7) (defining navigable waters as 
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rejected this possibility. Second, the saving clause might 
preserve state nuisance law only as it applies to discharges 
occurring within the source State; under this view a claim 
could be filed against IPC under New York common law, but 
not under Vermont law. This was the position adopted by 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee 
III. The Vermont Court nevertheless rejected this option, 
finding that "there is simply nothing in the Act which sug-
gests that Congress intended to impose such limitations on 
the use of state law." 602 F. Supp., at 269. 
The District Court therefore adopted the third interpreta-
tion of the saving clause, and held that a state action to re-
dress interstate water pollution could be maintained under 
the law of the State in which the injury occurred. Ibid. 
The Court was unpersuaded by the concern expressed in Mil-
waukee III that the application of out-of-state law to a point 
source would conflict with the CW A. It said there was no 
interference with the procedures established by Congress be-
cause a State's "imposition of compensatory damage awards 
and other equitable relief for injuries caused . . . merely sup-
plement the standards and limitations imposed by the Act." 
602 F. Supp., at 271 (emphasis in original). The Court also 
found that the use of state law did not conflict with the ulti-
mate goal of the CW A, since in each case the objective was to 
decrease the level of pollution. Ibid. 
The District Court certified its decision for interlocutory 
appeal, see 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill), and 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed for the 
reasons stated by the District Court. 776 F. 2d 55, 56 (1985) 
(per curiam). We granted certiorari to resolve the Circuit 
conflict on this important issue of federal pre-emption. 475 
U. S. --(1986). We now affirm the denial of !PC's motion 
''waters of the United States"); 118 Cong. Rec. 33756-33757 (1972), 1 Leg-
islative History of Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Com-
mittee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the 
Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 250 (1973) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.). 
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to dismiss, but reverse the decision below to the extent it 
permits the application of Vermont law to this litigation. 
We hold that when a court considers a state-law claim con-
cerning interstate water pollution that is subject to the 
CW A, the court must apply the law of the State in which the 
point source is located. 
II 
A brief review of the regulatory framework is necessary to 
set the stage for this case. Until fairly recently, federal 
common law governed the use and misuse of interstate 
water. See, e. g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry 
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 110 (1938) (water apportion-
ment); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496 (1906) (water poilu-
tion). 7 This principle was called into question in the context -I 
of water pollution in 1971, when the Court suggested in dicta J 
that an interstate dispute between a state and a private com-
pany should be resolved by reference to state nuisance law. 
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 499, n. 3 
(1971) ("[A]n action such as this, if otherwise cognizable in 
federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under 
state law") (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 
(1938)). 
We had occasion to address this issue in the first of two 
Supreme Court cases involving the dispute between Illinois 
and Milwaukee. In Milwaukee I, the State moved for leave 
to file an original action in this Court, seeking to enjoin the 
city from discharging sewage into Lake Michigan. Illinois 
v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972). The Court's opinion in 
that case affirmed the view that the regulation of interstate 
water pollution is a matter of federal, not state, law, thus 
7 Accord, North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 (1923); cf. Georgia 
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907) (air pollution); see also Mil-
waukee I, 406 U. S., at 104-107; Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Pri-
vate Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 152-155 (1985); 
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overruling the contrary suggestion in Wyandotte. 8 406 
U. S., at 102, n. 3. The Court was concerned, however, 
that the existing version of the Act was not sufficiently com-
prehensive to resolve all interstate disputes that were likely 
to arise. Milwaukee I therefore held that these cases should 
be resolved by reference to federal common law; the implicit 
corollary of this ruling was that state common law was pre-
empted. See id., at 107, n. 9; Milwaukee Ill, 731 F. 2d, at 
407. The Court noted, though, that future action by Con-
gress to regulate water pollution might preempt federal com-
mon law as well. 406 U. S., at 107. 
Congress thereafter adopted comprehensive amendments 
to the Act. We considered the impact of the new legislation 
when Illinois and Milwaukee returned to the Court several 
years later. 9 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981) 
(Milwaukee II). There the Court noted that the amend-
ments were a "'complete rewriting'" of the statute consid-
ered in Milwaukee I, and that they were "'the most compre-
hensive and far reaching'" provisions that Congress ever had 
passed in this area. 451 U. S., at 317-318 (citations to legis-
lative history omitted). Consequently, the Court held that 
federal legislation now occupied the field, preempting all 
federal common law. The Court left open the question of 
whether injured parties still had a cause of action under state 
law. Id., at 310, n. 4. The case was remanded for further 
consideration; the result on remand was the decision of the 
8 Although the Court's opinion could be read as distinguishing rather 
than overruling that part of Wyandotte, a later decision made it clear that 
state common law actions did not survive Milwaukee I. See Milwaukee 
II , 451 U. S., at 327, n. 19; see also Glicksman, supra, at 156, n. 176. 
9 In Milwaukee I the Court denied a motion to file an original action but 
ruled that Illinois could maintain an action in federal district court. The 
State then filed suit in Illinois District Court, alleging that the city was lia-
ble for creating a public nuisance under both federal and Illinois common 
law. The complaint also alleged a violation of the State Environmental 
Protection Act. See Milwaukee II , supra, at 310, and n. 4.; Milwaukee 
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee III, 
discussed supra. 
One of the primary features of the 1972 amendments is the 
establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES), a federal permit program designed to 
regulate the discharge of polluting effluents. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1342; see generally EPA v. California ex rel. State Water 
Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205-208 (1976) (de-
scribing NPDES system). Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 
U. S. C. § 1311(a), generally prohibits the discharge of any 
effluent into a navigable body of water unless the point 
source has obtained an NPDES permit from the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). The permits contain de-
tailed effluent limitations, and a compliance schedule for the 
attainment of these limitations. 
The amendments also recognize that the States should 
have a significant role in protecting their own natural re-
sources. 33 U. S. C. § 1251(b). The Act provides that the 
Federal Government may delegate to a State the authority to 
administer the NPDES program with respect to point 
sources located within the State, if the EPA Administrator 
determines that the proposed state program complies with 
the requirements set forth at 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). The Ad-
ministrator retains authority, however, to block the issuance 
of any permit to which he objects. § 1342(d). Even if the 
Federal Government administers the permit program, the 
source State may require discharge limitations more strin-
gent than those required by the Federal Government. See 
40 CFR § 122. l(f) (1986). Before the Federal Government 
may issue an NPDES permit, the Administrator must obtain 
certification from the source State that the proposed dis-
charge complies with the State's technology-based standards 
and water quality-based standards. 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(l). 
The CW A therefore establishes a regulatory "partnership" 
1 





8 INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. v. OUELLEITE 
While source States have a strong voice in regulating their 
own pollution, the CW A contemplates a much lesser role for 
States that share an interstate waterway with the source 
(the affected States). Even though it may be harmed by the 
discharges, an affected State only has an advisory role in 
regulating pollution that originates beyond its borders. Be-
fore a federal permit may be issued, each affected State is 
given notice and the opportunity to object to the proposed 
standards at a public hearing. 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(2); Mil-
waukee III, supra, at 412. An affected State has similar 
r ights to be consulted before the source State issues its own 
permit; the source State must send notification, and must 
consider the objections and recommendations submitted by 
other States before taking action. 10 § 1342(b). Signifi-
cantly, however, an affected State does not have the author-
ity to block the issuance of the permit if it is dissatisfied with 
the proposed standards. An affected State's only recourse is 
to apply to the EPA Administrator, who then has the discre-
tion to disapprove the permit if he concludes that the dis-
charges will have an undue impact on interstate waters. 
§ 1342(d)(2). Also, an affected State may not establish a sep-
arate permit system to regulate an out-of-state source. See 
§ 1342(b) (State may establish permit system for waters 
"within its jurisdiction" (emphasis added), Lake Erie Alli-
ance/or Protection of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1074-1075 (WD Pa. 1981), 
aff'd, 707 F. 2d 1392 (CA3), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 915 
(1983); State v. Champion International Corp., 709 S. W. 2d 
569 (Tenn. 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-57. Thus the Act 
1° For a more detailed description of the permit system, see R. Zener, 
Guide to Federal Environmental Law 61-88 (1981). _ 
The IPC was operating under a federal NPDES permit. App. 29-30. 
A draft of the permit was submitted to Vermont as an affected State, and 
Vermont as well as other interested parties objected to the proposed dis-
charge standards. Id., at 65-66. Thereafter, New York obtained permit-
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makes it clear that affected States occupy a subordinate posi-
tion to source States in the federal regulatory program. 
III 
With this regulatory framework in mind, we turn to the 
question presented: whether the Act pre-empts Vermont 
common law to the extent that law may impose liability on a 
New York point source. We begin the analysis by noting 
that it is not necessary for a federal statute to provide explic-
itly that particular state laws are pre-empted. Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 
707, 713 (1985). Although courts should not lightly infer 
pre-emption, 11 it may be presumed when the federal 
legislation is "sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary 
state regulation." Ibid. (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)). In addition to express or 
implied pre-emption, a state law also is invalid to the extent 
that it "actually conflicts with a ... federal statute." Ray v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978). Such a 
conflict will be found when the state law "'stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress."' Hillsborou,gh County v. 
Automated Medical Laboratories, supra, at 713 (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
A 
As we noted in Milwaukee II, Congress intended the 1972 
Act amendments to "establish an all-encompassing program 
of water pollution regulation." 451 U. S., at 318. We ob-
served that congressional "views on the comprehensive na-
ture of the legislation were practically universal." Id., at. 
11 See Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[W]e 
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and man-
ifest purpose of Congress"); Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 312; see also 
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318, n. 12 (citing legislative history). An examination of the 
amendments amply supports these views. The Act applies 
to all point sources and virtually all bodies of water, and it 
sets forth the procedures for obtaining a permit in great de-
tail. The CW A also provides its own remedies, including 
civil and criminal fines for permit violations, and "citizen 
suits" that allow individuals (including those from affected 
States) to compel the EPA to enforce a permit. 12 In light of 
this pervasive regulation and the fact that the control of in-
terstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law, Mi l-
waukee I, 406 U. S., at 107, it is clear that the only state 
suits that remain available are those specifically preserved by 
the Act. 
Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollu-
tion regulation, the saving clause negates the inference that 
Congress "left no room" for state causes of action. Respond-
ents read the language of the saving clause broadly to pre-
serve both a State's right to regulate its waters, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1370, and an injured party's right to seek relief under "any 
statute or common law,"§ 1365(e) (emphasis added). They 
claim that this language and selected portions of the legisla-
tive history compel the inference that Congress intended to 
preserve the right to bring suit under the law of any affected-
state. 13 We cannot accept this reading of the Act. 
12 See 33 U. S. C. §§ 1319(a), 1365(a), (h); see generally, Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 
1, 13-14 (1980) (discussing "elaborate" remedial provisions). 
1
• A Senate Report accompanying the amendments states: "[l]f damages 
could be shown, other remedies [in addition to a citizen suit] would remain 
available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a 
defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 
92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1499. Respondents also note that after 
reviewing the legislative history, the District Court found no evidence that 
Congress intended to alter the traditional tort law principle that a party 
may bring suit in the State where the injury occurred. See Young v. 
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To begin with, the plain language of the provisions on 
which respondents rely by no means compels the result they 
seek. Section 505(e) merely says that "nothing in this sec-
tion," i. e., the citizen-suit provisions, shall affect an injured 
party's right to seek relief under state law; it does not pur-
port to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions 
of the Act. Section 510, moreover, preserves the authority 
of a State "with respect to the waters (including boundary 
waters) of such State[]." This language arguably limits the 
effect of the clause to discharges flowing directly into a 
State's own waters, i. e., discharges from within the State. 
The savings clause then, does not preclude preemption of the 
law of an affected State. 
Given that the Act itself does not speak directly to the 
issue, the Court must be guided by the goals and policies of 
the Act in determining whether it in fact preempts an action 
based on the law of an affected State. Cf. City of Rome v. 
United States, 446 U. S. 156, 199 (1980) (POWELL, J., dis-
senting) ("We resort to legislative materials only when the 
congressional mandate is unclear on its face"). After exam-
ining the CWA as a whole, its purposes and its history, we 
are convinced that if affected States were allowed to impose 
separate discharge standards on a single point source, the in-
evitable result would be a serious interference with the 
achievement of the "full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress." See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical 
Laboratories, supra, at 713. Because we do not believe 
Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute 
through a general saving clause, 14 we conclude that the CW A 
14 We noted in Milwaukee II: 
"The fact that the language of [the saving clause] is repeated in haec verba 
in the citizen-suit provisions of a vast array of environmental legislation 
... indicates that it does not reflect any considered judgment about what 
other remedies were previously available or continue to be available under 
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precludes a court from applying the law of an affected State 
against an out-of-state source. 
B 
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law "stands as 
an obstacle" to the full implementation of the CW A, it is not 
enough to say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state 
law is to eliminate water pollution. A state law also is pre-
empted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal 
statute was designed to reach this goal. See Michigan Can-
ners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargain-
ing Bd., 467 U. S. 461, 477 (1984). In this case the applica-
tion of Vermont law against IPC would allow respondents to 
circumvent the NPDES permit system, thereby upsetting 
the balance of public and private interests so carefully ad-
dressed by the Act. 
By establishing a permit system for effluent discharges, 
Congress implicitly has recognized that the goal of the 
CW A-elimination of water pollution-cannot be achieved 
immediately, and that it cannot be realized without incurring 
costs. The EPA Administrator issues permits according to 
established effluent standards and water quality standards, 
that in turn are based upon available technology, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1314, and competing public and industrial uses, § 1312(a). 
The Administrator must consider the impact of the dis-
charges on the waterway, the types of effluents, and the 
schedule for compliance, each of which may vary widely 
among sources. If a State elects to impose its own stand-
ards, it also must consider the technological feasibility of 
more stringent controls. Given the nature of these complex 
decisions, it is not surprising that the Act limits the right to 
administer the permit system to the EPA and the source 
States. See § 1342(b). 
An interpretation of the saving clause that preserved ac-
tions brought under an affected State's law would disrupt 
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for violations of Vermont law, that law could effectively over-
ride both the permit requirements and the policy choices 
made by the source State. The affected State's nuisance 
laws would subject the point source to the threat of legal and 
equitable penalties if the permit standards were less strin-
gent than those imposed by the affected State. Such penal-
ties would compel the source to adopt different control stand-
ards and a different compliance schedule from those approved 
by the EPA, even though the affected State had not engaged 
in the same weighing of the costs and benefits. This case il-
lustrates the problems with such a rule. If the Vermont 
Court ruled that respondents were entitled to the full amount 
of damages and injunctive relief sought in the complaint, at a 
minimum IPC would have to change its methods of doing 
business and controlling pollution to avoid the threat of ongo-
ing liability. In suits such as this, an affected-state court 
also could require the source to cease operations by ordering 
immediate abatement. Critically, these liabilities would at-
tach even though the source had complied fully with its state 
and federal permit obligations. The inevitable result of such 
suits would be that Vermont and other States could do indi-
rectly what they could not do directly-regulate the conduct 
of out-of-state sources. 15 
Application of an affected State's law to an out-of-state 
source also would undermine the important goals of efficiency 
and predictability in the permit system. The history of the 
1972 amendments shows that Congress intended to establish 
"clear and identifiable" discharge standards. See S. Rep. 
No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1499. 16 As noted 
1
• The interpretation of the Act adopted by the Courts below also would 
have the result of allowing affected States effectively to set discharge 
standards without consulting with the source State, even though source 
States are required by the Act to give affected States an opportunity to be 
heard and a chance to comment before issuing a permit. 
1
• "The citizen suit provision [§ 505) is consistent with principles under-
lying the ... Act, [which are] the development of clear and identifiable re-
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above, under the reading of the saving clause proposed by re-
spondents, a source would be subject to a variety of common-
law rules established by the different States along the inter-
state waterways. These nuisance standards of ten are 
"vague" and "indeterminate." 11 The application of numerous 
States' laws would only exacerbate the vagueness and result-
ing uncertainty. The Court of Appeals in Milwaukee III 
identified the problem with such an irrational system of 
regulation: 
"For a number of different states to have independent 
and plenary regulatory authority over a single discharge 
would lead to chaotic confrontation between sovereign 
states. Dischargers would be forced to meet not only 
the statutory limitations of all states potentially affected 
by their discharges but also the common law standards 
developed through case law of those states. It would be 
virtually impossible to predict the standard for a lawful 
discharge into an interstate body of water. Any permit 
issued under the Act would be rendered meaningless." 
731 F. 2d, at 414. 
It is unlikely-to say the least-that Congress intended to 
establish such a chaotic regulatory structure. 
Nothing in the Act gives each affected State this power to 
regulate discharges. The CW A carefully defines the role of 
both the source and affected States, and specifically provides 
for a process whereby their interests will be considered and 
benchmarks for performance. " S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg. 
Hist. 1499. 
11 See Milwaukee II , 451 U. S., at 317; see also W. Prosser & W. 
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 616 (5th ed. 1984) ("There is perhaps 
no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds 
the word 'nuisance' "). The possibility that a source will have to meet a 
number of different standards is relatively small in this case, since Ver-
mont is the only State that shares Lake Champlain with New York. But 
consider, for example, a plant that discharges effluents into the Mississippi 
River. A source located in Minnesota theoretically could be subject to the 
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balanced by the source State and the EPA. This delineation 
of authority represents Congress' considered judgment as to 
the best method of serving the public interest and reconciling 
the of ten competing concerns of those affected by the pollu-
tion. It would be extraordinary for Congress, after devising 
an elaborate permit system that sets clear standards, to tol-
erate common-law suits that have the potential to undermine 
this regulatory structure. 
C 
Our conclusion that Vermont nuisance law is inapplicable 
to a New York point source does not leave respondents with-
out a remedy. The CW A precludes only those suits that 
may require standards of effluent control that are incompati-
ble with those established by the procedures set forth in the 
Act. The saving clause specifically preserves other state ac-
tions, and therefore nothing in the Act bars aggrieved indi-
viduals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of 
the source State. By its terms the CW A allows States such 
as New York to impose higher standards on its own point 
sources, and in Milwaukee II we recognized that this author-
ity may include the right to impose higher common-law as 
well as higher statutory restrictions. 451 U. S., at 328 (sug-
gesting that "States may adopt more stringent limitations 
... through state nuisance law, and apply them to in-state 
dischargers"); see also Committee for Jones Falls Sewage 
System v. Train, 539 F. 2d 1006, 1009, and n. 9 (CA4 1976) 
(CW A preserves common law suits filed in source State). 18 
18 Nothing in our decision, of course, affects respondents' right to pursue 
remedies that may be provided by the Act. If, as was also alleged in re-
spondents' complaint, IPC is violating the terms of its permit, respondents 
may bring a citizen suit to compel compliance. 33 U. S. C. § 1365. Re-
spondents also had the opportunity to protect their interests before the 
fact by commenting and objecting to the proposed standard. See Milwau-
kee II, supra, at 326 (Act provides "ample" opportunity for affected States 
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An action brought against IPC under New York nuisance 
law would not frustrate the goals of the CW A as would a suit 
governed by Vermont law. 19 First, application of the source 
State's law does not disturb the balance among federal, 
source-state, and affected-state interests. Because the Act 
specifically allows source States to impose stricter standards, 
the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt the regu-
latory partnership established by the permit system. Sec-
1
• The District Court concluded that the interference with the Act is in-
significant, in part because respondents are seeking to be compensated for 
a specific harm rather than trying to "regulate" IPC. 602 F. Supp. 264, 
271-272 (Vt. 1985). The Soliciter General, on behalf of the United States 
as amicus curiae, adopts only a portion of this view. He acknowledges 
that suits seeking punitive or injunctive relief under affected-state law 
should be pre-empted because of the interference they cause with the 
CWA. The Government asserts that compensatory damages, however, 
may be brought under the Jaw of the State where the injury occurred. 
The SG reasons that compensatory damages only require the source to pay 
for the external costs created by the pollution, and thus do not "regulate" 
in a way inconsistent with the Act. The Government cites Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 (1984), for the proposition that in certain 
circumstances a court may find pre-emption of some remedies and not 
others. 
We decline the Government's invitation to draw a line between the types 
of relief sought. There is no suggestion of such a distinction in either the 
Act or the legislative history. As the Court noted in Silkwood, unless 
there is evidence that Congress meant to "split" a particular remedy for 
pre-emption purposes, it is assumed that the full cause of action under 
state Jaw is available (or as in this case, pre-empted). Id., at 255. We 
also think it would be unwise to treat compensatory damages differently 
under the facts of this case. If the Vermont Court determined that re-
spondents were entitled only to the requested compensatory relie~ IPC J 
might be compelled to adopt different or additional means of pollution con-
trol from those required by the Act, regardless of whether the purpose of 
the relief was compensatory or regulatory. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 
U. S. 637, 651-652 (1971) (effect rather than purpose of a state statute gov-
erns pre-emption analysis). As discussed, this result would be irreconcil-
able with the CW A's exclusive grant of authority to the Federal Govern-
ment and the source State. Cf. Chicago & Nort,h Western Transportationl 
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ond, the restriction of suits to those brought under source-
state nuisance law prevents a source from being subject to an 
indeterminate number of potential regulations. Although 
New York nuisance law may impose separate standards and 
thus create some tension with the permit system, a source 
only is required to look to a single additional authority, whose 
rules should be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can 
be expected to take into account their own nuisance laws in 
setting permit requirements. 
IPC asks the Court to go one step further and hold that all 
state-law suits also must be brought in source-state courts. 
As petitioner cites little authority or justification for this 
position, we find no basis for holding that Vermont is an 
improper forum. Simply because a cause of action is pre-
empted does not mean that judicial jurisdiction over the claim 
is affected as well; the Act pre-empts laws, not courts. In 
the absence of statutory authority to the contrary, 20 the rule 
is settled that a district court sitting in diversity is competent 
to apply the law of a foreign State. 
IV 
The District Court correctly denied IPC's motion for sum-
mary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. Nothing in 
the Act prevents a court sitting in an affected State from 
hearing a common-law nuisance suit, provided that jurisdic-
tion otherwise is proper. Both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals erred, however, in concluding that Ver-
mont law governs this litigation. The application of affected-
state laws would be incompatible with the Act's delegation of 
authority and its comprehensive regulation of water pollu-
tion. The Act pre-empts state law to the extent that the 
state law is applied to an out-of-state point source. 
"'Cf. 33 U. S. C. § 1365(c)(l) (citizen suit to enforce permit must be 
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The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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-
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Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
Justice Brennan 




January 20, 1987 ~ 
SPl SALLY-POW 
85-1233, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette 
This case is here from the erg,. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
Petitioner operates a paper mill on the New 
York shore of Lake Champlain. Respondents are property 
owners / whose land is located across the Lake on the 
Vermont shore. Respondents brought suit in the Vermont 
District Court, l claiming that the mill was discharging 
1/ H,...~ 
pollutants into the Lake,/ and
1
this caused a "continuing 
nuisance" under Vermont law. 
Under present procedures authorized by the 
Clean Water Act,/ petitioner has obtained a permit to 
make these discharges in accord with both New York and 
federal law. 
Two questions are presented: First, whether 
the Vermont court has jurisdiction. And second, 
whether in light of the provisions of the Clean water 
Act, / the nuisance law of Vermont may be applied when 
the source of pollution is in New York? 
Petitioner moved for summary judgment, 
claiming that under the Clean Water Act, the suit could 
-L ~~1-A • .,«A ~ 
lA--t.- 'k.tj. -
2. 
only be maintained in New York - the state in which the 
mill is located. The District Court denied 
petitioner's motion, and the Court of Appeals fms tee 
Ceeens ..Ci ~ et1&~ affirmed. 
For the reasons stated in our opinion filed 
today, we agree that the property owners~ 
r~ cou,;Ld maintain this action in the Vermont 
federal court. W~ also ~f.;;/.;(, that the courts 
below erred in holding that the case could be decided 
under the nuisance law of Vermont. ~--.,..,. 
Under the Clea~ Water Act,~ New York as 
source stat~~- the state : wb:ich the pgllu'iieR 
o~ · e -- muat... i ~ mit consistent with both 
" federal • and state lawp as it ha.s= doAe_ 
The Clean Water Act is a comprehensive 
regulatory statute/ applicable to navigable waters in 
tv.L~ 
every state. ~ The act preempts all inconsistent state 
laws. We tb;n'c 9 t would interfere with the enforcement 
of the federal act/ if every affected state could apply 
~~,, 
its own law. We therefore~ that to the extent that 
Vermont law differs from that of New York, it is 
preempted. 
t2c:. t::.~-4, ( 
3. 
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN has filed an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting/ in part in which JUSTIC( MARSHALL 
and :n,s777~ BLACKMON have joined. JUSTICE STEVENS has 
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
partfa n which JUSTICE BLACKMON has joined. 
• -
85-1233 International Paper v. Ouellette (Andy) 
LFP for the Court 11/17/86 
1st draft 12/8/86 
2nd draft 1/9/87 
Joined by CJ 12/10/86 
BRW 12/22/86 
AS 12/22/86 
soc 12/31/ 86 
WJB concurring in part and dissenting in part 
1st draft 1/8/87 
2nd draft 1/13/87 
3rd draft 1/15/87 
Joined by HAB 1/12/87 
TM 1/12/87 
HAB 1/15/87 
JPS concurring in part and dissenting in part 
1st draft 1/14/87 
WJB will write separately 1/7/87 
Honorable Frank D. Wagner 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Reporter 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of the Solicitor General 
Washington , D.C. 20530 
March 2, 19 87 
Re: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 
No. 85-1233 (January 21, 1987) 
Dear Mr. Wagner: 
In the Court's opinion in the above case, in which the 
United States appeared as amicus curiae, the Court appears to 
have inadvertently addressed a controversial legal issue not 
raised or argued in the case -- an issue on which the lower 
courts are significantly divided. 
On page 10 of the slip opinion, the Court's opinion 
states: "The CWA also provides its own remedies, including civil 
and criminal fines for permit violations, and 'citizen suits' 
that allow individuals (including those from affected States) to 
compel the EPA to enforce a permit. 12/.'' The second half of 
this sentence addresses an issue -- whether the Clean Water Act 
"citizen suit" provision authorizes a suit to compel the EPA to 
enforce a permit -- which is the subject of ongoing litigation in 
the lower courts and over which the lower courts have sharply 
divided. Compare Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488-491 
(5th Cir. 1977) (no citizen suit to compel EPA permit enforce-
ment); Zemansky v. EPA, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1447, 1448 (D. 
Alaska 1986) (same); National Wildlife Federation v. Ruckelshaus, 
21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1776, 1780 (D. N.J. 1983) (same); and 
Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 533 F. Supp. 252, 255-257 (E.D. 
Ark. 1982) (same) with South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. 
Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D. S.C. 1978) (citizen suit may 
compel EPA permit enforcement); Greene v. Costle, 577 F. Supp. 
1225 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (same); and Illinois v. Hoffman, 425 F. 
Supp. 71, 76-77 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (same). 
-2-
We suggest that the sentence could be revised to state: 
"The CWA also provides its own remedies, including civil and 
criminal fines for permit violations, and 'citizen suits' that 
allow individuals (including those from affected States) to sue 
for injunctions to enforce the statute. 12/." This would simply 
repeat the language contained in the Court's prior opinion in 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1980), which the Court cites in 
footnote 12 on page 10 of the slip opinion in Ouellette. See 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Assn., 453 U.S. at 14 ("These citizen-suit provisions authorize 
private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these 
statutes."). 
cc: Peter F. Langrock 
Sincerely, 
CA~~-~ 
Charles Fried c 
Solicitor General 
Langrock, Sperry, Parker & Wool 
Drawer 351 
Middlebury, VT 05753 
Merideth Wright 
Assistant Attorney General 
Pavilion Building 
Montpelier, VT 05602 
Roy L. Reardon 
Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett 
One Battery Park Plaza 
New York City, NY 10004 
~u.preme (!j:cu:rt cf t!re ';!ltnilih ~taus 
~qto-rm cf ~eruJio-tul 
'Jllla.s£rington. ~- (!j:. 20.;iJ!.~ 
~-
March 3, 1987 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Re: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233 
Dear Justice Powell: 
7 
I am in receipt of the enclosed letter from Solicitor 
General Fried, in which he indicates his belief that the above 
opinion inadvertently addressed a controversial legal issue 
not raised in the case. I await your instructions as to how 
you wish me to proceed. 
Enclosure 
I 
j,u.prnru <ljo-urt qf t!f t> ~b j;tatu 
~l'p(tt"it>r of ~t>ri.shms 
~aeJrmgto-n. ~- <lj. 21lc?'!~ 
Honorable Charles Fried 
Solicitor General 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D. C. 20530 
March 5, 1987 
Re: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette 
No. 85-1233 
Dear Mr. Fried: 
~ 
I have conveyed your March 2 letter on the above to 
Justice Powell, and am authorized to tell you that your 
suggested resolution will be adopted in th 
Print. 
Frank D. Wagner 
Reporter of Decisions 
March 5, 1987 
85-1233 International Paper v. Ouellette 
M:UiA.ORANDUM TO CONFF.RENCE: 
I enclose page 10 of the Court's opinion in the 
above case, with two language changes suggested to the Re-
porter, Fr.ank Wagner, by the Solicitor General. 
The Solicitor General is correct that it has not 
yet been decided whether the Clean Water Act authorizes a 
"citizens' suit" to compel the EPA to enforce a permit. 
Absent objection, I will request the Reporter to 
make these changes. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 
cc: Fran!< D. Wagner, Esquire 
,.. 
CHAM l!IERS 0,. 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.fuprttttt (!lDUrl of tltt ~th .ita±ts 
-asqin.gbm, ~- <!l• 2.0-c?~, 
March 5, 1987 
85-1233 International Paper v. Ouellette 
MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE: 
I enclose page 10 of the Court's opinion in the 
above case, with two language changes suggested to the Re-
porter, Frank Wagner, by the Solicitor General. 
The Solicitor General is correct that it has not 
yet been decided whether the Clean Water Act authorizes a 
"citizens' suit" to compel the EPA to enforce a permit. 
Absent objection, I will request the Reporter to 
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ture of the legislation were practically universal." Id., at 
818, n. 12 (citing legislative history). An examination of the 
amendments amply supports these views. The Act applies 
to all point sources and virtually all bodies of water, and it 
sets forth-the procedures for obtaining a permit in great de-
fo tail. The CW A also provides its own remedies, including 
soc:.nc.~s ivil and criminal fines for permit violations, and "citizen 
'"J 11 suits" that allow individuals (including those from affected 
-.tes to to enforce · . u In light of 
s rvas1ve regulation an t e act that the control of in-
terstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law, Mil-
waukee I, 406 U. S., at · 107, it is clear that the only state 
suits that remain available are those specifically preserved by 
the Act. 
· Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollu-
tion regulation, the saving clause negates the inference that 
Congress "left no room" for state causes of action. Respond-
ents read the language of the saving clause broadly to pre-
serve both a State's right to regulate its waters, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1370, and an injured party's right to seek relief under "any 
statute or common law,"§ 1365(e) (emphasis added). They 
claim that this language and selected portions of the legisla-
tive history compel the inference that Congress intended to 
preserve the right to bring suit under the law of any affected-
state. 13 We cannot accept this reading of the Act. 
11 See 33 U. S. C. H 1319(a), 1365(a), (h); see generally, Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 
1, 13-14 (1980) (discussing "elaborate" remedial provisions). 
u A Senate Report accompanying the amendments states: "[l]f damages 
could be shown, other remedies [in addition to a citizen suit] would remain 
available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a 
defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 
9'l-414, p. 81 {1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1499. Respondents also note that after 
reviewing the legislative history, the District Court found no evidence that 
Congress intended to alter the traditional tort law principle that a party 
may bring suit in the State where the injury occurred. See Young v. 
MaJJci, 289 U.S. 253, 258-259 (1933). 
CHAM BERS OF 
J USTIC E SAN D R A DAY O'CONN O R 
~nµrtm.t ~ltltrt o-£ t4t ~itth ~bdt.ll' 
,ra,gftingfon, ~. ~. 21lffe'!~ 
March 5, 1987 
IA~~~ 
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I ) JIW. 
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Re: 85-1233 International Paper v. Ouellette 
Dear Lewis, 
I agree we should make the requested changes. 
This is the type of late change we discussed not long ago 
in Conference that we said should require that all parties 
to the case receive a copy of the revised opinion. No 




Copies to the Conference 
March 6, 1987 
85-1233 International Paper v. OuelletteMarch 6, 1987 
Dear Joe: 
At the suggestion of the Solicitor General, we have 
made a minor change in the language on p. 10 of the Court's 
opinion. 
My understanding ls that the Reporter's Office will 
incorporate this change in a new printing. When this is 
done, the Conference recently agreed that it would be a good 
idea to send a copy of the revised opinion to all of the 
parties in the case. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Reporter, 
Frank Wagner, who will lP-t you know when the revised opinion 
copies are available. 
Sincerely, 
Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Esq. 
cc - Frank Wagner, Esq. 
Copies to the Conference 
~~~ 
~u.vrnn.e Qj:ourl of tq.e ~h ~taus-
~.eport.er af ~.erisians-
~as-fyhtgtan, ~. Qj:. 20,;i).J.$ 
March 17, 1987 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Re: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 
No. 85-1233 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I am in receipt of the enclosed, sugg 
solution to the problem noted in Solicit · 
letter of March 2, 1987. I await your .olns 
Reporter 
~ I ? 
ns. 
March 31, 1987 
85-1233 International Paper v. Ouellette 
Dear Frank: 
I do not think the change suggested by Mr. Reardon 
is necessary. I suggest you write him along the following 
lines: 
"I have brought to the attention of Jus-
tice Powell the change you suggested. His 
v lew is that, having already agreed to the 
change proposed by the Solicitor General, a 
further change in this sentence is not neces-
sary. We do appreciate your bringing it to 
our at.tent ion." 
If you have any question about this, Frank, do not 
hesitate to talk to me. ~ 
Frank D. Wagner, Esquire 
Reporter of Decisions 
lfp/ss ~ 
Sincerely, 
